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Abstract 
Countries with high levels of growth-fostering business deregulation for domestic 
small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) appear to attract more FDI inflows than 
countries with low levels of business deregulation. This may be because SMEs in 
such deregulated countries attract ample cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As), which are a major conduit of FDI inflows. This study therefore investigates 
the relationship between FDI inflow and business deregulation. 
 
The study employs a triangulation of quantitative research methodologies and a panel 
data of 154 countries to analyze the relationship between FDI and deregulation.  
 
Results from the study generally show that there are statistically significant and 
inversely proportional relationships between inbound FDI and the deregulation of: (i) 
starting a business, (ii) paying taxes, and (iii) export trading, by a country‘s domestic 
SMEs. The study also documents positive correlations between cross-border M&As 
and inbound FDI. Thus, countries are likely to attract more FDI inflows, especially 
through cross-border M&As, as they deregulate the: starting of businesses, payment 
of taxes and exportation of products for their domestic SMEs. Therefore, on policy 
front, it is recommended that in order to enhance FDI inflows, countries ought to 
deregulate these areas of infringement to efficient running of SMEs; this finding 
provides a complementary and/or substitute policy to the popular outward-looking 
incentive programs for attracting FDIs. 
 
Key Words: Deregulation, Foreign Direct Investment, Mergers and Acquisitions, and 
Small and Medium Scale Enterprises 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
This study investigates the relationship between inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
business regulations that affect domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) of a 
country. 
 
This chapter explains the background to the study, the research problem, the objectives of the 
study, the study‘s significance and contribution to existing knowledge, the scope of the study 
and the study‘s methodology, and ends with the structure of the study.  
 
1.1  Background to the study 
Virtually all countries are keen to attract FDI as a means to generate new jobs, acquire new 
technologies and, more generally, promote growth and employment (OECD, 2008). The 
political and international focus on the importance of FDI for the developing countries has 
resulted in many developing countries giving incentives to foreign investors that are often not 
provided to domestic investors. Many business-related policy decisions of governments of 
developing countries have become influenced by a fear of scaring off foreign investors. For 
instance, governments make sure that exchange rates are not too variable in order not to harm 
foreign investors, often with negative consequences for the national economy and domestic 
businesses (OECD, 2008).  
 
In this regard, the wide range and sheer number of investment promotion instruments 
advocated and/or employed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World 
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Bank raise questions about their effectiveness. Most of the measures recommended for 
attracting FDI give foreign investors protection (in a similar way as takes place through 
bilateral investment treaties and free-trade areas (FTAs), with many African governments 
focusing on removing perceived barriers to foreign investors while extending little care and 
facilitation to domestic investors (SOMO, 2008). 
 
The conventional measures for attracting FDI are generally more focused on facilitating 
transnational corporations (TNCs) to pursue green-field FDI projects rather than cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), yet most FDI flows more through M&As than green-field 
projects (UNCTAD, 2009). For example, Ngowi (2001), UNCTAD (2008) and the US 
Department of State (2005) have observed that low-income countries (LICs) have 
continuously received a small share of global FDI inflows over time despite the full 
implementation of policy amendments recommended by institutions such as UNCTAD. This 
implies that the existing conventional strategies for attracting FDI to especially the least-
developed countries (LDCs) are not effective enough and thus need to be improved. 
 
Existing literature indicates that countries that rank high on the Ease of Doing Business 
indices also experience high FDI inflows. Thus, an investigation into the relationship between 
business deregulation for domestic businesses and FDI inflows is justified, as the Ease of 
Doing Business indices that determine such FDI inflows are based on are based on the 
relative regulation levels of various countries‘ business environments. Entities, such as 
UNCTAD, have recognised the potential of business deregulation to attract FDI inflows, but 
no known scientific study of the relationship between business deregulation and FDI has been 
conducted. For instance, in its Investment Policy Review of 1999, UNCTAD noted that 
Uganda‘s regulatory framework is not sufficiently developed to provide a clear structure for 
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FDI. UNCTAD (1999) also observed that the small size of the economy means that Uganda 
must work exceptionally hard on its regulatory framework to attract substantial investment 
from major international investors. However, these observations and recommendations are 
not backed by any known empirical analysis and findings. As much as many countries have 
liberalised their economies as one of the strategies for attracting FDI, many countries, 
especially the LICs and middle-income countries (MICs), still have heavy business 
regulations that inhibit the development of their domestic SMEs (World Bank, 2007). The 
domestic SMEs of heavily regulated countries are generally so stunted that they do not 
facilitate cross-border M&As, which are the main conduits for FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 
2008). This makes it crucial to understand and contribute to knowledge of the major policy 
effect of business deregulation for especially domestic SMEs on inbound FDI. 
 
Thus, it is against this background that this study aims at filling this gap by investigating the 
relationship between inbound FDI and deregulation for domestic businesses, particularly the 
indigenous Small and Medium scale Enterprises.  
 
1.2  Statement of the research problem 
Poor deregulation of domestic businesses apparently inhibits inbound FDI because it stunts 
the growth of most domestic businesses and thus makes these businesses unattractive for 
cross-border M&As, yet such M&As form a major channel for FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 
2008). Heavily -regulated countries, most of which are LICs and MICs (World Bank, 2010); 
generally attract less FDI inflows than their counterparts/HICs (UNCTAD, 2010). The 
conventional measures for attracting FDI in most LICs and several MICs generally facilitate 
foreign investors, while the domestic businesses remain heavily regulated (SOMO, 2008). 
Whereas most countries have liberalised and stabilised their economies and made several 
other policy reforms as some of the strategies for attracting FDI, many countries, especially 
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the LICs and MICs, still have intensely regulated business environs that inhibit the prosperity 
of their domestic SMEs (World Bank, 2007). Consequently, most domestic SMEs of heavily 
regulated countries are so underdeveloped that they hinder ample cross-border M&As, which 
are the main conduits for FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2008). Most of the LICs and MICs seek 
foreign investors that target green-field FDI projects rather than the cross-border M&A type 
of FDI, yet FDI inflow through cross-border M&As has increasingly been more than that 
through green-field FDI projects (UNCTAD, 2009). Such biased FDI-pull government 
policies compromise the capacity of domestic businesses to contribute towards attraction of 
FDI through cross-border M&As and taxes that can be used to establish infrastructure 
necessary for increased investments. Thus, the cross-border M&As and their subsequent FDI 
inflows, registered in the heavily regulated LICs and MICs, have for long been a very small 
proportion of the global share (UNCTAD, 2010). It appears that deregulation that facilitates 
domestic SMEs has not been effectively utilised as a strategy to attract FDI, especially 
through cross-border M&As by most of the LICs and MICs. These observations make it 
imperative to empirically investigate the relationship between business deregulation that 
facilitates the development of domestic SMEs and inbound FDI. 
 
1.3  Objectives of the study and research questions  
The main objective of the study is to investigate the relationship between inbound FDI and 
the deregulation of domestic SMEs of any given country. The key research question derived 
from the main objective of the study is thus: What is the relationship between inbound FDI 
and the deregulation of domestic SMEs of any given country? 
 
The specific objectives that emanate from the key research question stated above are to: 
 investigate the relationship between deregulation of starting a business and FDI; 
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 determine the relationship between deregulation of paying taxes and FDI; and 
 investigate the relationship between deregulation of export trading and FDI.  
These specific objectives are synonymous with the sub-problems of the study and were 
addressed by seeking answers to the following specific research questions:  
 What is the relationship between FDI and the deregulation of starting a business? 
  What is the relationship between FDI and the deregulation of paying taxes? 
 What is the relationship between FDI and the deregulation of export trading? 
It is thus important to point out that the analyses in the subsequent chapters are guided by the 
specific objectives and/or questions outlined above. 
 
1.4 The study’s significance and contribution to existing knowledge  
The study presents novel and potent measures for attracting substantial FDI inflows to the 
heavily regulated LICs and MICs in particular by advocating for business deregulation that 
can catalyse increased cross-border M&As. The research reveals statistically significant 
relationships between inbound FDI and business deregulation tailored to benefit domestic 
SMEs of a country. A considerable causal relationship between deregulation and FDI is also 
established using Granger causality tests. The study establishes that through deregulating the 
starting of businesses, payment of taxes and export trading by domestic SMEs, a country is 
likely to realise greater FDI inflows, especially in the form of cross-border M&As. 
Specifically, the study proves that a reduction in the procedures, time and costs of starting a 
business, paying taxes and exporting enables domestic businesses of a country to flourish and 
thereby attract greater FDI inflows through cross-border M&As. Thus, the research findings 
augment recommendable measures that are empirically and statistically proven to realise 
greater and sustainable FDI inflows through facilitating the development of domestic 
businesses. 
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The study indicates that hitherto, most incentives for attracting FDI focus on facilitating 
foreign investors who are targeting green-field FDI projects, yet globally, most FDI flows are 
in the form of cross-border M&As (UNCTAD, 2009). Thus, the study reveals that domestic 
SMEs of most countries, notably the LICs and MICs, are stunted due to heavy regulations, 
yet they should be the primary drivers of cross-border M&As that consequently ensure 
substantial FDI inflows. The research reveals major constraints to and proposes appropriate 
measures for substantial FDI flows to heavily regulated countries, and especially the LICs, 
that were hitherto ignored by investment promotion agencies and policy makers. By 
recommending consistent deregulation that facilitates domestic SMEs, the study establishes 
solutions to several economic limitations such as corruption, bureaucratic and structural 
bottlenecks/red-tape, limited tax bases and underdeveloped domestic markets, among other 
factors, that are typical of particularly the heavily regulated LICs and many MICs. By 
emphasising cross-border M&As as opposed to green-field FDI projects, the study 
remarkably offers a multifaceted (‗double-barrel‘) approach to realising economic growth and 
development, particularly for the heavily regulated LICs and MICs. Heavily regulated 
countries that competitively seek FDI inflows can substantially facilitate prosperity of their 
respective domestic SMEs by implementing the recommendations made in this study.  
 
The study can substantially assist policy makers, academia and practitioners in establishing 
effective policies and strategies for social-economic growth and development. Authorities, 
institutions, agencies, bodies and/ or organisations that are responsible for enhancing FDI 
inflows can benefit tremendously from this research by recognising and applying new 
strategies for boosting inbound FDI. This is because the study provides quantitative premises 
and benchmarks that can stimulate debate on policies, both by exposing potential challenges 
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and by identifying where policy makers can identify lessons and good practices. The study 
provides measurable comparative data on business deregulation, which can inspire 
governments, of especially the LICs, to reform their investment policies and thereby enhance 
FDI inflows, especially through cross-border M&As, as their respective domestic 
entrepreneurs develop. Investment promotion agencies, governments and international 
entities such as UNCTAD can use this research as a basis for proposing and recommending 
new feasible policy reforms for realising greater FDI inflows to their stakeholders and 
beneficiaries. Prospective investors can utilise the study findings to make better-informed 
business decisions as they prepare to invest in especially LDCs such as Uganda. The study 
also provides a basis for conducting further studies concerning the relationships between FDI 
and business deregulation. 
 
1.5  Scope, limitations and delimitations of the study 
The time scope of the study is five years, stretching from 2005 to 2009, because it is only 
during this period that comprehensive data were available for all the variables that were used 
for the panel data analysis.  
 
The geographical and population scope of the study covered 204 countries identified by 
UNCTAD (2010) as autonomous or semi-autonomous political economies located in the 
various continents of the world.  
 
The theoretical scope of the study is FDI inflows and business deregulation of domestic 
SMEs with a focus on the ease of starting a business, paying taxes and export trading. The 
study focuses on only three out of the 10 key variables of business deregulation identified by 
the World Bank as the measures of ease of doing business so as to allow for a thorough, in-
depth investigation. These three key variables have a total of 10 sub-variables and have been 
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selected because they have the most comprehensive data for a balanced panel data set used in 
this study. Business deregulation referred to in this study is tailored to benefit and facilitate a 
country‘s domestic SMEs located in the most populous city of a country, in particular, 
because the data upon which this study is based are also on SMEs located in such cities.
1
 
 
The study is limited to specific measurements and operational definitions of FDI inflows and 
business deregulation, as explained in Chapter Three. The focus of the study is on the 
monetary value of inbound FDI, but not its quality. The study does not cover FDI outflows or 
the suitability (quality and utilisation) of the FDI flowing to the host countries, but focuses on 
FDI inflows only. 
 
1.6 Operational and contextual definitions of the key concepts and variables 
The following key concepts and variables have special textual and/or operational meanings in 
this study, as explained below.  
 
1.6.1 Deregulation (business deregulation) 
Deregulation as a concept has various definitions. Kahn (1988), for instance, defines 
deregulation as the means by which governments remove, reduce or simplify restrictions on 
businesses and individuals in order to (in theory) encourage the efficient operation of 
markets. Winston (1993) defines deregulation as the removal of government controls from an 
industry or sector to allow for a free and efficient marketplace. It is vital to note that 
deregulation is not the same as liberalisation because many economies are liberalised but still 
have heavy business regulations, especially for their indigenous SMEs (World Bank, 2007).  
 
 
                                                 
1
 The Ease of Doing Business database and Doing Business reports by the World Bank, upon which this study 
greatly relied for data on business deregulation, focuses business regulations of SMEs in the most populous 
cities of the countries studied. 
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In this study, however, deregulation contextually refers to the ease of doing business through 
official policies that reduce, simplify or remove procedural, time and/or cost constraints 
experienced by investors, and especially the domestic SMEs in a country. This definition is 
principally derived from the Doing Business annual reports and the Ease of Doing Business 
database that have been compiled by the World Bank since 2004. 
 
The specific components of business deregulation that are considered in this study are 
operationally defined as follows: 
 
1.6.1.1 Deregulation of export trading  
Deregulation of export trading refers to governments‘ tendency to remove, reduce or simplify 
the costs, time and procedures involved in exporting a standardised (20-feet container) 
shipment of goods.  
 
1.6.1.2 Deregulation of paying taxes 
Deregulation of paying taxes refers to governments‘ tendency to remove, reduce or simplify 
the tax that a SME must pay or withhold in a given year, as well as measures of the 
administrative burden of paying taxes. This entails lessening the number of tax payments a 
business entity (SME) must make; the number of hours spent preparing, filing, and paying 
taxes; and the percentage of its profits it must pay in taxes. 
1.6.1.3 Deregulation of starting a business  
 
Deregulation of starting a business refers to the government‘s tendency to remove, reduce, or 
simplify restrictions on the procedures, time, and costs for a limited liability company (i.e., 
formal SME) to legally start operations.  
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1.6.2 Developed country 
A developed country, also termed a ‗more developed country‘ (MDC), refers to any one of 34 
countries recognised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an ‗advanced economy‘ 
(World Bank, 2007). The developed countries (MDCs) referred to in this study are thus 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America  
1.6.3 Foreign direct investment  
Foreign direct Invest (FDI or Inbound FDI), in the context of this study refers to any 
investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by 
a resident entity of one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or 
affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). This operational definition of FDI refers to only 
inbound FDI and is directly derived from that given by the OECD (2008), and UNCTAD 
(2008). 
 
1.6.4 Green-field FDI project 
A green-field FDI project, in the context of this study, refers to a form of FDI where a parent 
company starts a new venture in a foreign country by constructing new operational facilities 
from the ground up where no previous facilities exist. It is thus an alternative to other forms 
of investment, such as M&As, joint ventures or licensing agreements. The concept emerges 
from the idea of building a facility literally on a ‗green‘ field, such as a farmland or a forest. 
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1.6.5 High-income country  
A high-income country (HIC), in the context of this study, refers to a country whose gross 
national income (GNI) per capita is equivalent to US$12 196 or more. This definition of 
HICs is the same as that given by the World Bank (2009a). 
1.6.6 Least-developed country (LDC) 
A Least Developed Country, in this study, refers to a country with such a low income that its 
three-year average estimate of GNI per capita of less than US$905 and that has a population 
of not more than 75 million. Such countries are also characterised by substantial human 
resource weakness and economic vulnerability. This definition of LDCs is the same as that 
advanced by UNCTAD, (2008). 
1.6.7 Low-income country  
A low income country (LIC), in this study, refers to a country with a gross national income 
per capita equal to or less than US $ 995. This definition is the same as that advanced by the 
World Bank (2009).  
1.6.8 Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
The concept ―mergers and acquisitions‖ (M&As), in the context of this study, refers to the 
aspect of corporate strategy, corporate finance and management dealing with the buying, 
selling and combining of different companies that can aid, finance or help a growing 
company in a given industry to grow rapidly without having to create another business entity. 
A ‗merger‘ is the combination of two or more companies to form a new company altogether, 
while an ‗acquisition‘ specifically refers to the purchase of one company by another 
company.  
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1.6. 9 Middle-income country (MIC) 
A middle income country (MIC) refers to any country whose gross national income per capita 
is between US$996 and US$ 12 195. This definition again is according to the classification of 
such countries by the World Bank (2009). 
 
 
1.6.10 Small and medium-sized enterprise  
 
Small and medium enterprises (SME), in this study, are defined according to the definition of 
the World Bank (2010) whereby ‗small enterprises‘ refer those businesses that employ 
between five and nineteen people, while ‗medium-sized enterprises‘ are those businesses 
employing between 20 and 99 people. This study focuses on domestic (i.e. ordinary, often 
indigenous/locally owned) SMEs operating within a country‘s most populous city, because 
the panel data analysed for this study are based on the same type of businesses. These 
domestic SMEs are alternatively referred to as the ‗business‘ or ‗businesses‘ in this study. 
 
1.7 Abridged methodology of the study 
The study is based on a triangulation of quantitative research methodologies with a focus on 
cross-sectional time series panel data empirical modelling of the relationship between 
business deregulation and inbound FDI of various countries. An estimated random effects 
model (REM) of regressions that are based on cross-sectional time series feasible generalised 
least squares (FGLS) is the principal methodology applied to investigate the relationship 
between FDI and business deregulation. The other methodologies used are Granger-causality 
tests, correlations and descriptive statistics of the study variables for a sample of 154 
countries. The rationale for choosing these methodologies is explained in Chapter Three. 
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The study is designed as applied, secondary (desktop) research based on panel data derived 
from the World Investment reports and Ease of Doing Business indices published by 
UNCTAD and the World Bank respectively for the period 2005–2009.  
1.8 Basic assumptions of the study 
The main assumption of the study is that countries with business deregulation that facilitates 
the development of their domestic SME investors are bound to realise more FDI inflows, 
particularly through cross-border M&As. 
 
The other assumptions of the study are: 
 FDI is vital and necessary for the economic growth of all economies and thus all 
countries relentlessly compete for FDI inflows.   
 The share of the global FDI realised in developing countries can expand depending on 
the measures taken to attract foreign investment. 
 The cases and samples for the study are representative of the general research 
population.  
 The secondary data collected and used as a basis for the conclusions and 
recommendations of the study are authentic, empirical, conventional and reliable.  
 
1.9 Structure of the study 
The study is stratified into five chapters, with each chapter comprising several sections and 
having a distinct focus, as explained below: 
Chapter One: Introduction to the study. This covers the background to the study, the 
statement of the research problem, the objectives of the study and key research questions, the 
significance of the study and its contribution to existing knowledge, the scope of the study, 
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operational and contextual definitions, a synopsis of the research methodology and the 
description of how the study is structured.   
Chapter Two: Literature review. This contains an overview of the global trends of FDI and 
deregulation, cross-border M&As and FDI, the relationship between FDI and deregulation, 
the conceptual framework and the hypotheses of the study.  
Chapter Three: Research methodology. This chapter explains the research design, the 
study population and sampling, types and sources of data, measurement of the variables, the 
analysis and interpretation of data, the regression models of the study and the reliability, 
validity and dissemination of the findings. 
Chapter Four: Results, presentation and discussion. Here the output of data analysis is 
presented and discussed within the study‘s conceptual framework and according to the study 
objectives and hypotheses. 
Chapter Five: Conclusions and recommendations. This comprises of a conclusive 
summary of the discussions of the research findings and recommended measures for 
addressing the research problem.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter covers an overview of the global trends of FDI and business deregulation, 
highlights why some countries have been receiving more FDI than others and reviews the 
theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the relationship between business deregulation and 
FDI. The chapter ends with the conceptual framework and hypotheses of the study. 
 
2.1 Global trends of foreign direct investment and deregulation-Overview 
The rapid advances in technology in the last few decades – especially in transport and 
communication – have led to tremendous increases in FDI. Global inward FDI flows rose 
from US$59 billion in 1982 to a peak of US$1 491 billion in 2000. On an annual average 
basis, FDI inflows increased from 23.1 percent in the period 1986–1990 to 40.2 percent over 
the period 1996–2000 (UNCTAD, 2008). This implies that as time goes by, inward FDI 
received by various countries in the world generally increases. This surge of FDI inflows may 
be attributed to the rising levels of the social, economic and political globalization. However, 
it is important to note that while most countries register increasing FDI inflows, some 
countries do register stagnated and/or reducing FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2009).  
 
In terms of regional distribution, developed countries account for the bulk of global FDI 
inflows (Table 2.1). Until the early 1990s, the share of FDI inflows to the developed 
countries represented more than three-quarters of the total flows. For the period 2005–2009, 
the share of FDI inflows to the developed countries was over 60 percent of the global FDI 
flows, as shown in Table 2.1 below. 
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Table 2.1: FDI inflows attained by the various economic blocks of the world: 2005–2009 
(in millions of US dollars) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
World  985 796 1 459 133 2 099 973 1 770 873 1 114 189 
Developed economies  624 529  970 098 1 444 075 1 018 273  565 892 
Europe  509 148  628 420  988 422  551 059  378 388 
North America  130 465  296 897  374 371  379 830  148 540 
Developing economies  330 166  434 366  564 930  630 013  478 349 
Africa  38 197  55 382  63 092  72 179  58 565 
Sub-Saharan Africa  25 961  32 232  38 307  48 081  40 279 
Latin America & Caribbean  75 955  94 557  163 612  183 195  116 555 
Asia & Oceania  216 014  284 426  338 226  374 639  303 230 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database, 2009  
 
Table 2.1 above clearly illustrates that between 2005 and 2009, the FDI inflows realised by 
sub-Saharan Africa, where 70% of the LDCs are located, was less than 4% of the global FDI 
inflows. This was despite the fact that most of the LDCs diligently implemented most of the 
conventional policies and reforms recommended for attracting FDI (UNCTAD, 2008). It is, 
however, vital to note that the domestic businesses of such LDCs are considerably more 
regulated than those of the developed countries (World Bank, 2009) and sub-Saharan Africa 
registers only a very small fraction of the global cross-border M&As (UNCTAD, 2009).  
 
The levels of business deregulation of the developed countries have generally been a lot 
higher than those noted in most of the developing countries between 2004 and 2009 (World 
Bank, 2009). The LDCs, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa, have been particularly 
noted to have the poorest ranking in business deregulation in the whole world since 2004 
(World Bank, 2009). Figure 2.1 below corroborates the facts stated above by highlighting the 
variance in the levels of deregulation pertaining to a few variables of business regulations for 
the various income categories of the countries in the world.  
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Figure12.1: Levels of business deregulation for LICs, MICs and HICs  
Note that the indicators for high-income countries are used as benchmarks. The average value 
of each indicator is shown above each column. 
 
The variance in business deregulation highlighted by Figure 2.1 above is possibly responsible 
for the low FDI inflows realised by the LDCs. This is because the poor levels of deregulation 
in LDCs are likely to inhibit the prosperity of their domestic businesses, rendering them 
unattractive to foreign investors, despite the fact that most FDI flows are in the form of cross-
border M&As (UNCTAD, 2009).  
 
2.2 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, deregulation and FDI 
Over 70% of the global FDI flow is in the form of cross-border M&As and only less than 
30% of FDI is attracted through green-field FDI projects (UNCTAD, 2009). Despite this 
observation, the developing countries and the LDCs have always had a comparatively larger 
number of green-field FDI projects than cross-border M&As as illustrated by Table 2.2 
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below. This possibly explains why the developing countries and LDCs realise comparatively 
less FDI inflows. 
Table22.2: Cross-border M&As and green-field FDI projects attained by the various 
economic blocks of the world in 2002 and 2007 (UNCTAD, 2008) 
Region Number of green-field FDI 
projects 
 Number of cross-border 
M&As 
 2002 2007  2002 2007 
World 5 703 11 703  6 553 10 145 
Developing countries 2 362 4 922  1 302 2 273 
Africa 170 380  80 174 
Sub-Saharan Africa 95 184  63 143 
Latin America & Caribbean 565 780  390 644 
Asia & the Pacific 1 627 3 762  832 1 455 
 
Table 2.2 above shows that the proportion of the number of M&As globally registered by the 
developing countries decreased substantially between 2002 and 2007. The table also shows 
that the smallest number and poorest growth rate of cross-border M&As were registered in 
sub-Saharan Africa, which comprises the majority of LDCs with the lowest levels of 
deregulation. These revelations can be attributed to the fact that the developing countries and 
especially the LDCs generally have lower level of business deregulation than their 
counterparts (World Bank, 2009). Hence, the domestic SMEs of the developing countries are 
generally stunted and thus unsuitable for cross-border M&As (UNCTAD, 2000). This 
indicates that business deregulation for the prosperity of domestic SMEs is a basic 
requirement to stimulate cross-border M&As through which most FDI inflows are realised.  
A total number of 108 cross-border M&A deals, each worth over US$1 billion, were 
completed in the year 2009 alone and the total worth of all the 108 deals was approximately 
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US$352.5 billion (UNCTAD, 2010). This further proves that a considerable number and 
amount of FDI flows are in form of cross-border M&As.  
 
The empirical and theoretical underpinning of the relationship between business deregulation 
and FDI is explained in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
2.2 Relationship between deregulation and FDI: Theoretical underpinning 
Heavy business regulation has a perverse effect on the people it is meant to protect (World 
Bank, 2007). Faced with a large regulatory burden and few incentives to become formal, 
entrepreneurs in many developing countries choose to operate in the unofficial economy. Bad 
institutions—cumbersome entry procedures, rigid employment laws, weak creditor rights, 
inefficient courts and overly complex bankruptcy laws—simply do not get used. Instead, 
businesses use informal institutions, which is an improvement but a poor substitute for good-
practice regulation. In most heavily regulated economies, over 50% of the business activity 
takes place in the informal sector. It is hard for businesses to get credit or resolve disputes 
through formal institutions, such as courts. Growth is inhibited because transactions take 
place only within a narrow group of established business relationships. The resources for 
delivering basic infrastructure are reduced because businesses do not pay taxes. There is no 
quality control of products and entrepreneurs keep their operations small, below an efficient 
production size, for fear of inspectors and the police. The results: poor economic outcomes, a 
reduced tax base and a large group of entrepreneurs and businesses never entering the formal 
sector. It is in the most heavily regulated countries that investment and productivity are low 
and unemployment is high (World Bank, 2006). Heavier regulation is generally associated 
with greater inefficiency of public institutions and more corruption but not with better quality 
of private or public goods. The countries that regulate the most (i.e. the LDCs), have the least 
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enforcement capacity and the fewest checks and balances to ensure that regulatory discretion 
is not used to abuse businesses and extract bribes (World Bank, 2007). 
 
It is also noted that regardless of how business deregulation is determined, the rich countries 
(MDCs) regulate their respective businesses the least and protect property rights the most. By 
combining modest levels of business regulation with property rights that are clearly defined 
and well protected, the rich countries achieve what many others strive to do: have regulators 
act as public servants and not public masters (World Bank, 2006). The World Bank further 
observes three findings concerning the practice of business regulation, namely: regulation 
varies widely around the world; heavier regulation of business activity generally brings bad 
outcomes, while clearly defined and well protected property rights enhance prosperity; and 
rich countries regulate business consistently on all dimensions, while poor countries do not 
(World Bank, 2009).  
 
The facts stated above indicate that most domestic SMEs of heavily regulated countries are 
generally so underdeveloped that they are not suitable for cross-border M&As. Hence, the 
heavily regulated countries can not attract substantial FDI inflows, as most FDI flows in 
through cross-border M&As (UNCTAD, 2009).   
 
The empirical and theoretical underpinnings of the relationships between FDI and the specific 
independent variables of this study are stated in the subsequent sub-sections. 
 
2.2.1 Deregulation of starting a business and FDI 
When entrepreneurs draw up business plans and try to implement them, the first hurdles they 
face are the procedures required to incorporate and register the new firm before they can 
legally operate (Barseghyan, 2008). This observation highlights regulatory constraints that 
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businesses, especially the SME start-ups, face while starting business which may inhibit their 
prospects of appealing to foreign investors seeking mergers and /or acquisitions thus enhance 
FDI inflows.  
 
Countries differ greatly in how they regulate the entry of new businesses. In some, the 
process is straightforward and affordable. In others, especially the developing countries, the 
procedures are so burdensome that entrepreneurs may have to bribe officials to expedite the 
process or they may decide to run their business informally. Cumbersome entry procedures 
are associated with more corruption, particularly in developing economies. Each procedure is 
a point of contact, a potential opportunity to extract a bribe. Analysis shows that burdensome 
entry regulations do not increase the quality of products, make work safer or reduce pollution. 
Instead, they constrain private investment; push more people into the informal economy; 
increase consumer prices and fuel corruption (Alesina, Silvia, Giuseppe & Fabio, 2005).  
 
Antunes and Cavalcant (2007), Djankov,   ganser, Mcliesh, Ramalho & Shleifer (2008) and 
Klapper, Luc and Rajan (2006) observe that lower costs of entry can encourage 
entrepreneurship and reduce corruption. According to UNCTAD (2007), flourishing 
entrepreneurship and reduced corruption are basic requirements for cross-border M&As, 
which are the basic media for FDI inflows.  
 
Djankov et al. (2008) observe that lower barriers to start-up are associated with a smaller 
informal sector. Many developing economies make starting a business so cumbersome that 
entrepreneurs opt out and operate in the informal sector.  
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Barseghyan (2008,) observes that easier start-up is correlated with higher productivity among 
existing firms. A study, in an analysis of 97 countries, finds that reducing entry costs by 80 
percent of income per capita increases total factor productivity by an estimated 22 per cent. 
Analyzing 157 countries, it finds that the same reduction in entry costs raises output per 
worker by an estimated 29 percent. Such privileges as observed by Barseghyan (2008) above 
can only accrue to countries that uphold deregulation of starting businesses and that attract 
FDI (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
Simpler and faster business entry makes it easier for workers and capital to move across 
sectors when economies experience economic shocks. A study of 28 sectors in 55 countries 
compared sectoral employment reallocation in the 1980s and 1990s (Barseghyan, 2008). The 
finding was that reallocation is smoother in countries where it takes fewer days to start a 
business. This finding is confirmed by many studies on the effect of entry regulation in 
economies opening their product markets to trade, as observed by Caves (1996) and 
Helpman, Marc and Yona (2008). 
 
The Investor Glossary (2009) indicates that deregulation provides an economic environment 
favourable to upstart companies that were unable to enter the industry prior to the passing of 
deregulation. It is also widely held that deregulation often serves as a catalyst for increased 
innovation and mergers among weaker competitors (Fisman & Virginia, 2004).  
 
Djankov, Rafael, Florencio and Shleifer (2002) observed that cumbersome entry procedures 
push entrepreneurs into the informal economy, where businesses pay no taxes and many of 
the benefits that regulation is supposed to provide are missing. Svensson (2003) notes that as 
a consequence of lack of business deregulation, workers lack health insurance and pension 
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benefits; products are not subject to quality standards; businesses cannot obtain bank credit or 
use courts to resolve disputes; women are disadvantaged disproportionately, as they 
constitute 75% of informal employees; and corruption is rampant, as bureaucrats have many 
opportunities to extract bribes. All these result from poor deregulation of starting a business 
and prove unfavourable for FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2007). 
 
New entry of formal businesses grows when regulation is relaxed and administrative 
processes are simplified. For instance, registrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia 
and Russia shot up by over 15% after start-up procedures were streamlined (World Bank, 
2006). Enticing enterprises to the formal economy has two economic benefits. First, because 
formally registered enterprises have less need to hide from government inspectors and the 
police, and second, they grow to more efficient sizes. As more companies move to the formal 
economy, governments can lower the tax burden on all firms. This gives every business more 
incentive to produce. International evidence suggests that a 1% reduction in taxes is 
associated with a 3.7% increase in firms, a 0.9% increase in sales and a 1.1% increase in 
employment (World Bank, 2005). Alesina et al. (2005) observe that there are other benefits 
of carrying out deregulation of starting a business, one of which is the associated increase in 
investment.  
 
In conclusion, various authors have observed that deregulation of starting a business leads to 
the formation of increased numbers of formally established and prosperous businesses in a 
country. The more the number of such formal prosperous businesses in a country, the higher 
the opportunities for cross-border M&As, which are the major conduits for FDI flows  
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2.2.2 Deregulation of paying taxes and FDI 
It is generally observed that taxes are essential for availing funds for the basic public services 
vital to a well-functioning economy and an inclusive society. However, firms in 90% of the 
countries covered by the World Bank Enterprise Survey rank tax rates and tax administration 
among the top five obstacles to doing business (World Bank, 2008).  
 
Businesses generally prefer lower tax rates that are applied in a straightforward and simple 
way or, if rates are high, businesses want something (i.e. good services) in return for tax 
payments. All too often this is not the case, especially in developing countries. Across 
countries, higher taxes payable are not associated with better social outcomes, even 
controlling for country income levels. Instead, outcomes of high tax rates have generally 
proven deterrent and repulsive to business investors (World Bank, 2009). Having a simple tax 
system with standardised rates and payment channels is fundamental to the ease of doing 
business. Such a simple tax system normally appeals to not only domestic investors of a 
country but also foreign direct investors (World Bank, 2004).  
 
Studies examining cross-border FDI flows suggest that on average, FDI decreases by 3.7% 
following a 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate on FDI. Some recent studies found, for 
example, that FDI is becoming increasingly sensitive to taxation. Such estimates may be used 
to estimate the long-term impact of corporate tax reform on FDI (OECD, 2008). Thus, 
deregulation of paying taxes, by especially a country‘s indigenous SMEs, is likely to increase 
FDI inflows. 
 
Where taxes are high and commensurate gains seem low, many businesses simply choose to 
stay informal. A recent study found that higher tax rates are associated with less private 
investment, fewer formal businesses per capita and lower rates of business entry. The 
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analysis suggests, for example, that a 10% increase in the effective corporate tax rate reduces 
the investment-to-GDP ratio by 2 percentage points (Djankov et al., 2008). Desai, Foley and 
Hines (2004) also observe that a 10% cut in indirect taxes, such as value added tax, may 
imply a rise in investment of up to 7%. Goolsbee (2002) observes that a cut of 1 percentage 
point in corporate tax rates is associated with up to a 3.7% increase in the number of firms 
and up to 1.1% higher employment.  
 
The literature reviewed above generally indicates that the deregulation of paying taxes 
favours domestic businesses, which can then lead to FDI inflows through cross-border 
M&As. There is therefore a need to address the plight of domestic entrepreneurs whose 
prosperity catalyses cross-border M&As that can enhance FDI inflows. However, no known 
empirical study has focused on the relationship between deregulating tax payments to 
equitably benefit domestic and foreign investors and FDI inflows. Thus, this study fills the 
research gap through an empirical analysis of the relationship between deregulating the 
number of tax payments per year, time spent on taxes and total tax rate (percentage of profit) 
affecting domestic SMEs and FDI inflows.  
 
 
2.2.3 Deregulation of export trading and FDI 
High costs and delays in export trading constrain participation in global trade for businesses 
in many countries. In a recent study of 126 economies, the loss from export delays was 
calculated at around 1% of trade for each extra day. For perishable agricultural products, the 
cost is nearly 3% of the volume of trade for each day‘s delay. Some non-agricultural products 
are also time-sensitive, such as fashion apparel and consumer electronics. The more time-
consuming the export or import process, the less likely that a trader will be able to reach 
markets in a timely fashion. This affects the ability to expand businesses (World Bank, 2009). 
Sadikov (2007) finds that each extra signature an exporter has to collect reduce trade by 
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4.2%. For high-end exports, the reduction is nearly 5%. For manufactured exports, the cost of 
export trade transactions in developing countries, which includes the cost of dealing with 
customs and inland transport, exceeds the cost imposed by tariffs in the European Union and 
the USA (Sadikov, 2007).  Sadikov (2007)‘s observations above imply that reforming 
policies that regulate trade across borders is likely to stimulate growth of domestic enterprises 
and ultimately lead to increased FDI inflows through cross-border merger and acquisitions. 
However, countries with highly deregulated trade across border are likely to experience 
increased trade vices such as smuggling, dumping and entry of counterfeits which 
compromise the suitability and competitiveness of their domestic investment climate.   
 
Red tape is estimated to cost more than 10% of the value of exports in developing countries. 
Inefficient customs and trade transport mean that businesses in developing countries must 
hold larger inventories at their warehouse, adding 4% to 6% to production costs. Thus, just-
in-time manufacturing, which is one of the major determinants of FDI inflows, is not easily 
achievable in such developing countries (Subramanian & Anderson, 2005).  
 
Economies that reduce delays in export trading can integrate more rapidly in the global trade 
(World Bank, 2009) and such economies register relatively more substantial FDI inflows than 
their counterparts (UNCTAD, 2008). Empirically, countries with cumbersome export trading 
attain considerably less FDI inflows compared to their counterparts. 
 
The filing of a large number of export documents is often associated with more corruption in 
customs and faced with long delays and frequent demands for bribes, many traders avoid 
customs altogether. Instead, they smuggle goods across the border. Smuggling defeats the 
very reason for having border control of trade: to ensure high quality of goods and levy taxes. 
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If governments want to make it easier to run businesses, reducing export and import trade 
costs is a good place to start (World Bank, 2008).  
 
Entrepreneurs in the LDCs and many developing countries face numerous regulatory hurdles 
to exporting and their share of the global trade has subsequently reduced tremendously 
despite the surge of faster ships and bigger planes that have shrunk the world. One reason is 
that in the case of manufactured goods, customs and transport together represent the single 
greatest cost of trading in developing countries – even higher than the cost of tariffs on their 
exports imposed by rich countries (World Bank, 2006). 
 
The observations stated above indicate that cumbersome export trading is not conducive for 
establishing domestic businesses that have a potential of attracting FDI inflows through 
cross-border M&As. Countries that deregulate export trading for both their domestic and 
foreign investors register relatively more substantial FDI inflows than their counterparts 
(UNCTAD, 2008; World Bank, 2009). However, there is no known study that focuses on the 
quantitative analysis of the relationship between deregulation of export trading to benefit a 
country‘s domestic SMEs and FDI inflows. This research gap therefore further justifies the 
cause for this study.  
 
2.3 The conceptual framework of the study 
The conceptual framework of this study is derived from the inference that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between FDI inflows and business deregulation tailored to 
benefit domestic SMEs of a country. The study is based on the conception that business 
deregulation for domestic SMEs can attract cross-border M&As, which in turn lead to 
significant FDI inflows. This is because cross-border M&As account for the biggest 
proportion of global FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2008). Hence, once domestic SMEs are 
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facilitated to prosper through deregulation, more cross-border M&As will occur, and thereby 
more FDI inflows will be realised in the country. The study focuses on three major variables 
of a country‘s deregulation, namely the deregulation of starting a business (with four sub-
variables), paying taxes (with three sub-variables) and exporting (with three sub-variables) as 
well as the monetary value (US$ millions) of FDI realised. The conceptual interrelationships 
of these study variables are as illustrated in Figure 2.2 below.     
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Figure22.2: Conceptual framework of the study (Author’s conceptualisation based on 
the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business database and UNCTAD’s World Investment 
reports) 
 
Figure 2.2 above illustrates the interrelationships among the variables that were deemed to be 
integral to the dynamics of the relationship investigated. It thus displays the conceptualised 
relationships among the criterion (FDI), explanatory variables (deregulation) and an 
intervening variable (cross-border M&As). 
 Deregulation of starting a business 
o Procedures (number) 
o Time (days) 
o Cost (percentage of income per capita) 
o Minimum capital (percentage of 
income per capita) 
 
 Deregulation of export trading  
o Documents (number) 
o Time (days) 
o Cost (US$ per 20-feet container) 
 
 Deregulation of paying taxes 
o Payments (number per year) 
o Time (hours per year) 
o Total tax rate (percentage of profit) 
Criterion/ 
dependent 
variable): 
 FDI inflows 
(US$ millions) 
 
Explanatory variables: 
Business deregulation indicators 
Intervening variable 
 
Cross-border M&As 
(number) 
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2.4  Hypotheses of the study 
A hypothesis is a logically conjectured relationship between two or more variables expressed 
in the form of a testable statement (Babbie, 2007). Thus, the study generally sets out to test 
the following null and alternate hypotheses:  
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between business deregulation  
       and inbound FDI. 
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between business deregulation and  
        inbound FDI. 
The specific hypotheses tested are derived from the specific objectives of the study, which 
are as stated below:  
 
The null and alternative hypotheses used to investigate the relationship between deregulation 
of starting a business and inbound FDI are as follows: 
 
H0a: There is no statistically significant relationship between deregulation of  
 starting a business and inbound FDI.  
H1a: There is a statistically significant relationship between deregulation of starting 
a business and inbound FDI. 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses used to investigate the relationship between the specific 
variables of deregulation of starting a business and FDI inflows are as follows: 
 
H0a1: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the number   
of procedures for starting a business and inbound FDI. 
H1a1: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the number of  
           procedures for starting a business and inbound FDI. 
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H0a2: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the time   
(days) for starting a business and inbound FDI. 
H1a2: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the time (days)  
           for starting a business and inbound FDI. 
 
H0a3: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the cost  
          (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business and inbound FDI. 
H1a3: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the cost 
           (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business and inbound FDI  
 
H0a4: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the minimum  
capital (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business and inbound 
FDI. 
H1a4: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the minimum  
capital (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business and inbound 
FDI. 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses used to investigate the relationship between deregulation 
of paying taxes and FDI inflows are as follows: 
 
H0b: There is no statistically significant relationship between the deregulation of 
paying taxes and inbound FDI. 
H1b: There is a statistically significant relationship between deregulation of paying 
taxes inbound FDI and. 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses used to investigate the relationship between the specific 
variables of deregulation of paying taxes and FDI inflows are as follows: 
 
H0b1: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the number of  
           tax payments and inbound FDI. 
H1b1: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the number of  
          tax payments and inbound FDI. 
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H0b2: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the time  
           (hours) spent on paying taxes and inbound FDI. 
H1b2: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the time (hours)  
          spent paying taxes and inbound FDI. 
 
H0b3: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the total tax 
           rate (percentage of profit) and inward FDI. 
H1b3: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the total tax rate 
          (percentage of profit) and inward FDI. 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses used to investigate the general relationship between 
deregulation of export trading and FDI inflows are as follows: 
 
H0c: There is no statistically significant relationship between deregulation of export 
trading and inbound FDI.   
H1c: There is a statistically significant relationship between the deregulation of export 
trading and inbound FDI. 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses used to investigate the relationship between the specific 
variables of deregulation of export trading and FDI inflows are as follows: 
H0c1: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the number of  
          documents completed for exporting a 20-feet container of goods and FDI. 
H1c1: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the number of            
           documents completed for exporting a 20-feet container of goods and FDI. 
 
H0c2: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the time (days)  
          for exporting a 20-feet container of goods and inbound FDI. 
H1c2: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between and the time  
          (days) for exporting a 20-feet container of goods and inbound FDI 
  
H0c3: There is no statistically significant inverse relationship between the cost (US$)  
          of exporting a 20-feet container of goods and inbound FDI. 
H1c3: There is a statistically significant inverse relationship between the cost (US$) of  
          exporting a 20-feet container of goods and inbound FDI.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter is a description of the research methodology used in this study. The chapter 
covers the research design, study area, study population, samples and sampling technique, 
type and sources of data, analysis and interpretation of data and the reliability and validity of 
the study and ends with dissemination of the study findings and recommendations. 
 
3.2  Research design 
A research design comprises six basic aspects, namely the purpose of the study, the type of 
investigation, the extent of researcher interference, the study setting, unit(s) of analysis and 
the time horizon of the study (Sekaran, 2003). These six components for this study‘s design 
are described below. 
 
3.2.1  Purpose of the study 
The purpose of a research study can be exploratory, descriptive, hypothesis testing and/or a 
case study analysis (Sekaran, 2003, p. 119). The purpose of this study is hypothesis testing. 
Hypothesis testing design is applied to explain the relationships and interdependencies among 
factors (variables) of interest. Specifically, hypothesis testing is undertaken to explain the 
variance in the dependent variable (FDI) by variations in the explanatory variables (variables 
of business deregulation for domestic SMEs) (Sekaran, 2003).  
 
3.2.2  Type of investigation 
The type of investigation conducted is correlational so as to delineate the critical variables 
associated with the study problem (Sekaran, 2003). The study entails a triangulation of 
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quantitative research techniques with a focus on empirical time series longitudinal panel data 
modelling of the relationship between FDI and business deregulation for domestic SMEs. 
The investigation generally assumes a positivism paradigm so as to remain objective and 
scientific in nature and also because it is predominantly quantitative (Neuman, 2000). The 
study is designed as applied research by relying on empirical data to establish viable solutions 
to real-life problems (Amin, 2006). The specifics of the empirical test techniques (models) of 
the study are elaborated upon in Section 3.6. 
 
3.2.3  Study setting and extent of researcher interference  
 
The extent of the researcher interference with the natural (normal) environment of the study 
setting has been  minimal in order to study the key variables and events as they normally 
occur as recommended for social scientific studies (Sekaran, 2003).  
 
The research is invariably conducted in a non-contrived setting so as to ensure reliable and 
valid correlation of the study variables within their normal (natural) settings (Sekaran, 2003). 
 
3.2.4. Units of analysis 
 
The unit of analysis refers to the level of aggregation of data collected during the subsequent 
data-analysis stage (Sekaran, 2003). The units of analysis for this study are countries (i.e. 
individual nations/economies) and groups of countries (i.e. country groupings) based on the 
various levels of GNI per capita, as recognised by UNCTAD (2010) and the World Bank 
(2010) respectively. The country groups used as units of analysis for the study are low 
income countries (LICs), middle income countries (MICs), and high income countries (HICs) 
as defined and recognised by the World Bank (2010). The choice of these country groupings 
was based on the observation by the World Bank (Doing Business reports and database, 
2005–2010) that business deregulation is generally directly proportional to the level of a 
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country‘s GNI per capita. Hence, the LICs represent the most heavily regulated countries; the 
MICs are generally moderately deregulated, while the HICs are the most deregulated 
category. Likewise, the HICs have since 1990 received the highest proportion of cross-border 
M&As and inbound FDI, followed by the MICs and the LICs receive the least 
(UNCTAD/World Investment Report, 2010). The specific countries and groups of countries 
that constitute the units of analysis for this study are listed as appendices to this report.  
 
3.2.5  Time horizon of the study 
 
The time horizon design for the research comprises of a combination of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies (Panel Data) so as to counteract the weaknesses pertaining to purely 
cross-sectional or solely longitudinal studies (Sekaran, 2003). Some aspects are analysed 
longitudinally where data on specific variables were collected at various successive points in 
time, while other variables were subjected to cross-sectional studies. The time scope for the 
longitudinal time series data is 2005 to 2009. The choice of this time limit (2005-2009) is 
based on the fact that this is the only period for which data on all the study variables were 
available to enable the compilation of a balanced panel.  
 
3.2.6  Study area  
The geographical study area covers 154 countries spread over the various continents of the 
world. The study is based on a sample of 154 out of a population of 204 countries because 
these are the only countries with the relevant recorded data for all the study variables. 
 
3.3  Study population and sampling 
The study population consists of 204 countries, while the study sample is made up of 154 
countries (subjects) that are recognised by UNCTAD (2010) as autonomous or semi-
autonomous political economies. Lists of the sampled LICs, MICs and HICs are appended to 
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this report. The study sample of 154 countries was derived purposively basing on the 
establishment that these are the only countries with accessible data for each of the study 
variables and in the selected time scope. This approach is used so as to come up with a 
balanced set of panel data, which is more recommendable for panel data modelling than the 
unbalanced panel (Greene, 2003). Ideally, the study would have covered all the 204 
countries, if all the relevant data for each country could be accessed.  
 
3.4  Types and sources of data 
The research is principally based on secondary quantitative cardinal data on business 
deregulation and FDI that were collected through a desk-top review of various literatures. 
Such cardinal data are chosen because they are based on objective measurements and are thus 
very reliable (Jon & Roger, 2008). 
 
The major sources of data on business deregulation are Doing Business reports and the Ease 
of Doing Business database compiled by the World Bank, while data on FDI is obtained from 
the World Investment reports compiled by UNCTAD. The rationale for choosing these two 
sets of publications as the main sources of data for the study is that each of these sources 
provides well-researched, detailed, reliable, objective, comprehensive and empirical data, as 
further explained below.  
 
Justification for relying on the Doing Business reports and Ease of Doing Business 
database for data on business deregulation 
The Doing Business annual reports and the Ease of Doing Business database are the only 
substantial sources for well-compiled, compared and ranked laws, policies, regulations and 
institutional arrangements that shape the daily economic activities of over 180 countries 
(World Bank, 2009). These sources provide well-researched, valid, objective and reliable 
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quantitative measures of business deregulation, as they apply to the life cycles of domestic 
SMEs across various economies and selected cities at the sub-national and regional level 
(World Bank, 2010).  
 
The downside of the Doing Business reports and the Ease of Doing Business database, 
however, is that the Doing Business project does not measure all aspects of the business 
environment that matter to firms or investors – or all factors that affect competitiveness. It 
does not, for example, measure security, macroeconomic stability and corruption. The 
methodology applied in compiling the Doing Business reports and the Ease of Doing 
Business database has limitations that were considered when interpreting the data. First, the 
collected data refer to businesses in the economy‘s largest business city and may not be 
representative of regulation in other parts of the economy. Second, the methodology assumes 
that the business has full information on what is required and does not waste time when 
completing procedures, which is not always the case in the real world (World Bank, 2010). 
 
Justification for relying on the World Investment reports for FDI data 
 
The World Investment reports contain scientifically developed and thorough analyses of the 
trends in FDI, global ranking of TNCs, in-depth analysis of all FDI-related topics, basic FDI 
policy analysis and recommendations, and statistical annexes with data on FDI flows and 
stocks for over 195 countries/economies (UNCTAD, 2008). 
3. 5 Measurement of the study variables 
The measurements of the criterion and explanatory variables of the study are exactly as 
presented by the World Investment reports and Doing Business reports and the Ease of Doing 
Business database that are respectively compiled by UNCTAD and the World Bank.  
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The criterion (dependent/inbound FDI) variable is thus measured in millions of US dollars on 
a net basis (i.e. credits of capital transactions less debits between direct investors and their 
foreign affiliates). FDI inflows with a negative sign that feature in this study indicate that at 
least one of the three components of FDI (i.e. equity capital, reinvested earnings or intra-
company loans) is negative and is not offset by positive amounts of the other components, or 
represent instances of reverse investment or disinvestment (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
The independent variables are measured according to their respective analogous variables in 
the Ease of Doing Business indices that are compiled by the World Bank, as explained below. 
 
The Deregulation of starting a business variable is measured as a direct equivalent of a 
country‘s global rank on the Ease of Starting a Business indices, as determined by the World 
Bank (2010). This variable comprises four sub-variables measured as 1) the number of 
procedures to legally start and operate a company (i.e. registration requirements such as name 
verification and notarisation and registration in the economy‘s most populous city and post-
registration requirements such as social security registration and company seal); 2) time 
(days) required to complete each procedure of starting a business (such time is calculated on 
the assumption that it does not include days spent gathering information, each procedure 
starts on a separate day, each procedure is completed once a final document is received and 
no prior contact with officials existed; 3) cost required completing each procedure measured 
as percentage of income per capita (this focuses on official costs only, and excludes bribes 
and professional fees, unless services were required by law); and 4) paid-in minimum capital, 
also measured as percentage of income per capita (this refers to only the money deposited in 
a bank or with a notary before registration begins). 
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The Deregulation of paying taxes variable is measured as a direct replica of the global 
ranking on the Ease of Paying Taxes indices by the World Bank (2010). Thus, this variable 
comprises three sub-variables that are measured as 1) the number of tax payments made by a 
manufacturing company, including any formal contributions paid and consumption taxes 
(value added tax), and the method and frequency of payment in a year; 2) time (hours) spent 
on complying with three major taxes (this specifically focuses on collection of information to 
compute tax payable, completing tax forms, filing with proper agencies, arranging or 
withholding payment and preparing separate tax accounting books); and 3) the total tax rate, 
measured as a percentage of profit, paid by each business (this takes into consideration the 
profit or corporate income tax; social contributions and labour taxes paid by the employer; 
property and property transfer taxes; dividends, capital gains and financial transactions taxes; 
and the taxes for waste collection, vehicle, road and other services). 
 
The Deregulation of export trading variable is measured as the global ranking on the Ease of 
Trading across Borders indices by the World Bank (2010). This independent variable 
comprises three sub-variables, which are measured as follows: 1) the number of documents 
necessary to export, with a focus on bank documents, customs clearance documents, port and 
terminal handling documents, and transport documents; 2) time (days) required to export (this 
considers obtaining all the export documents, inland transport, customs clearance and 
inspections and port and terminal handling, but excludes ocean transport time; and 3) cost to 
export measured in US dollars for a 20-feet container (this measure considers only the official 
charges/fees (no bribes) for obtaining all the necessary documents, inland transport, customs 
clearance and inspections, and port and terminal handling. 
 
The time period for all the criterion and explanatory variables is measured in annual years. 
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3.6 Analysis of data and empirical models of the study 
Triangulation of quantitative techniques has been applied to analyse data so as to enhance the 
reliability and validity of the findings (Amin, 2006). The main methodologies applied include 
empirical panel data modelling of the relationship between deregulation and FDI using the 
estimated log of the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) regression as a suitable 
technique of the Random Effects Model (REM). Percentiles of the units of measurements for 
the various variables are generally applied in the empirical panel data modelling, as it is 
prudent and recommendable to base such models on a common unit of measurement (Greene, 
2003). Panel data modelling has been applied because of its various advantages identified by 
Wooldridge (2009), as explained below. The other major quantitative techniques applied 
include: PAIRWISE correlations, Pearson product-moment correlation, Granger-causality 
tests and descriptive statistics of the study variables for various countries and country 
groupings.   
Data have been analysed within a framework of the basic research questions and hypotheses 
using the Stata computer statistical software version 10 (2003) and the Statistical Package for 
Social Scientists (SPSS) Version 16.  
 
3.6.1 Models of the study 
The study is generally based on the econometric model stated here below:  
ititit bdI             (1) 
Where: 
itI  FDI inflows  
itbd  Business deregulation variables 
 Coefficient of business deregulation 
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 = Constant  
 Error term  
i = The cross-sectional unit identifier  
t = The time period  
The model stated above is developed into a more specific model that focuses only on the 
variables that constitute the scope of the study, as presented in Equation 2 below:  
itit uititit 3322110         (2) 
Where: 
it  FDI inflows to various economies over time (i.e. dependent variable) 
0  Constant (intercept) 
1 Coefficient for deregulation of starting a business 
1 Deregulation of starting a business as a predictor variable 
2  Coefficient for deregulation of paying taxes  
2 Deregulation of paying taxes as a predictor variable 
3  Coefficient for deregulation of export trading 
3  Deregulation of export trading as a predictor variable 
u= Error component/term (i.e. random disturbance) 
i = The cross-sectional unit identifier (i.e. individual dimension/countries analysed,  
       i.e. i=1, 2, 3,….n countries) 
t = The time period identifier (i.e. the time dimension/years covered. i.e., t= 
 1, 2, 3,…..n years = 2005 ≥ 2009 for this study) 
  
The criterion and explanatory variables of the general conceptual model above are then tested 
for normality in their respective distributions and it is proved that FDI, the dependent 
variable, is leptutic and skewed. Thus, a natural log of FDI (LnFDI) is applied in the 
estimated model following Wooldridge (2009), as shown here below: 
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itititit 3322110
ˆˆˆˆˆln           (3) 
Where: 
it
ˆln Estimated natural log of the dependent variable (i.e. FDI inflows)  
0
ˆ  Estimated constant  
1
ˆ Estimated regression coefficient for deregulation of starting a business  
1  Deregulation of starting a business  
2
ˆ   Estimated regression coefficient for deregulation of paying taxes  
2  Deregulation of paying taxes   
3
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for deregulation of export trading   
3  Deregulation of export trading    
i = The cross-sectional unit identifier (i.e. individual dimension/countries analysed)  
t = The time period identifier (i.e. the time dimension/years covered) 
A Hausman specification test is then applied to the study sample so as to choose between a 
Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and Random Effects Model (REM) as an appropriate 
specification for the model represented by equation 3 above.  At a 5% level of significance, 
the Hausman test outcome is in favour of the REM. The FGLS technique of the REM 
emerges as the most appropriate for the study because the variance structure (Ω matrix) of the 
panel data is not known (Woodridge, 2002). Subsequently, the study model is represented by 
Equation 4 below:  
itiitit
'
           (4) 
    = ititit w
'
 
 
Where: 
itiitw  and i ~ IID ),0(
2
and it ~ IID ),0(
2
. The i  is assumed independent of 
it  and  it , which are also independent of each other for all i and t. 
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Also in Equation  (4) above: it  FDI inflows, 
'  all the variables of business 
deregulation (i.e. predictors), coefficients (slopes) for the predictors,  intercept, i = 
the cross-section, or individual error component, it = the combined time series and cross-
section error component, i  the time period identifier, and t  the time period identifier (i.e. 
the time dimension/years covered; i.e. t = 1, 2, 3, …n years = 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 
2009 for this study). 
 
Sub-models are thereafter derived from the general models stated earlier to facilitate the 
regression of FDI against each of the major explanatory variables, as described in Equations 
(3) and (4) above. This is done to present a detailed analysis of the estimated impact of each 
of the three major predictors on the criterion variable. These sub-models are presented below. 
  
Sub-models of the estimated model 
The model represented by Equation (4) above is further split into three sub-models to cater 
for the relationship between the criterion variable and each of the three predictor variables, as 
explained below.    
 
Regression model of FDI on deregulation of starting a business 
 
itititit ddccbbaait
ˆˆˆˆˆˆln 0        (1') 
Where: 
it
ˆln  Estimated natural log of the dependent variable (i.e. FDI inflows) 
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a
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the procedures (number) for starting a business 
b
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the time (days) for starting a business  
c  Estimated regression coefficient for the cost (percentage of income per capita) for 
          starting a business  
d
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the time (days) for starting a business  
a Procedures (number) for starting a business  
b Time (days) for starting a business  
c Cost (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business  
d Minimum capital (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business  
i = The cross-sectional unit identifier (i.e. individual dimension/countries analysed)  
t = The time period identifier (i.e. the time dimension/years covered) 
 
Regression model of FDI on deregulation of paying taxes 
 
ititit ggffeeit
ˆˆˆˆˆln 0         (2
'
) 
 
Where:  
it
ˆln  Estimated natural log of FDI inflows  
e
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficients for the number of tax payments per year 
f
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for time (hours) spent paying taxes per year  
g
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the total tax rate (percentage of profit) 
e Number of tax payments per year 
f Time (hours) spent on paying taxes per year  
g Total tax rate (percentage of profit) 
Deregulation, FDI, M&As, and SMEs Page 45 
 
 i = The cross-sectional unit identifier (i.e. individual dimension/countries analysed)  
t = The time period identifier (i.e. the time dimension/years covered) 
 
Regression model of FDI on deregulation of export trading 
 
ititit jjiihhit
ˆˆˆˆˆln 0        (3
'
) 
 
Where:  
it
ˆln Estimated natural log of FDI inflows 
h
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the number of export documents  
i
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the time (days) for exporting a 20-feet container of  
          goods  
j
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the cost (US$ per container) of exporting  
h Number of official documents used to export a 20-feet container of goods  
i Time (days) spent on exporting a 20-feet container of goods  
j Cost (US dollars) to export a 20-feet container of goods  
i = The cross-sectional unit identifier (i.e. individual dimension/countries analysed) 
 t = The time period identifier (i.e. the time dimension/years covered) 
 
3.6.2 Justification for choosing the techniques used for data analysis 
The reasons for choosing the specific techniques used for data analysis in this study are that 
panel data, and therefore panel data analyses, are very informative (with more variability, less 
collinearity and more degrees of freedom), estimates are more efficient, they allow the study 
of individual dynamics (e.g. separating age and cohort effects), they give information on the 
time ordering of events and they allow controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity. 
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As unobserved heterogeneity is the problem of non-experimental research, the latter benefit is 
especially useful (Greene, 2003). Panel data analysis can provide a rich and powerful study of 
a set of people, as one considers both the space and time dimension of the data (Gujarati, 
2003). The panel data modelling or analysis conducted is a vital method of studying a 
particular subject within multiple sites, periodically observed over a defined timeframe 
(Gujarati, 2003). Panel data analysis endows regression analysis with both a spatial and 
temporal dimension. The spatial dimension of panel data pertains to a set of cross-sectional 
units of observation, while the temporal dimension pertains to periodic observations of a set 
of variables characterising these cross-sectional units over a particular time span 
(Wooldridge, 2009). With repeated observations of enough cross-sections, panel analysis 
permits the study of the dynamics of change within short time series. Panel data analysis is an 
increasingly popular form of longitudinal data analysis among social and behavioural science 
researchers and has enabled researchers to undertake longitudinal analyses in a wide variety 
of fields (Twisk, 2003). The combination of time series with cross-sections can enhance the 
quality and quantity of data in ways that would be impossible using only one of these two 
dimensions (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
A random effects model (REM) is deemed appropriate for this study‘s panel data analysis 
because the Hausman test proves that the REM is more efficient than the Fixed Effects Model 
(FEM) and can also give consistent results (Greene, 2003). Preference of the REM to the 
FEM is also based on the fact that the covariance matrix (Ω, i.e. the variance components) for 
this study‘s data is not known. The REM is also chosen because it normally gives better P-
values which serve as more efficient estimators. Therefore it is advisable to apply the REM 
whenever it is statistically justifiable to do so (Greene, 2003). Other reasons for preferring the 
REM to the FEM are that FEMs have significant drawbacks (Greene, 2003). For instance, 
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FEMs frequently have too many cross-sectional units of observations requiring too many 
dummy variables for their specification (Wooldridge, 2009). Too many dummy variables 
may sap the model of sufficient numbers of degrees of freedom for adequately powerful 
statistical tests (Greene, 2003). A fixed effects model with many dummies can easily be 
plagued with multi-collinearity, which increases the standard errors and thereby drains the 
model of statistical power to test parameters (Wooldridge, 2009). Although the FEM 
residuals are assumed to be normally distributed and homogeneous, there could easily be 
country-specific (group-wise) heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation over time, which may 
further plague estimation (Wooldridge, 2009). Because the individuals (countries and 
variables pertaining to each country) studied are greater in magnitude (units) than the units of 
the (years) time period dimension (i.e. the N > T dimension), the REM proves more 
appropriate for the study than the FEM (Wooldridge, 2009). The REM has the distinct 
advantage of allowing for time-invariant variables to be included among the regressors 
(Chatfield, 1989).  
 Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS), rather than generalised least squares (GLS) 
regression, are chosen as a basis for regressions using the REM, because FGLS-based 
regression uses an estimated variance-covariance matrix when the true matrix is not known 
(Wooldridge, 2009). In other words, the FGLS-based regression technique is used to estimate 
the variance structure because the Ω for the panel data is not known. Regressions effected 
using FGLS are based on the assumption of homoskedasticity, which simplifies mathematical 
and computational treatment and usually leads to adequate estimation results (Wooldridge, 
2009). The preference of FGLS to GLS and ordinary least squares is asymptotic, as the FGLS 
estimator is typically unbiased and is also asymptotically efficient among the class of linear 
unbiased estimators (Ruud, 2000).  
Deregulation, FDI, M&As, and SMEs Page 48 
 
The Granger-causality test approach is applied because it one of the most potent techniques to 
investigate a causal relationship between the criterion and predictor variables of a study 
(Granger, 1969).  
The PAIRWISE correlation technique is chosen it is the most suitable and applicable 
technique for the Stata software applied and the panel data analysed (Greene, 2003). 
Pearson Product-moment correlation is chosen to investigate the correlations between the 
dependent, intervening and predictor variables of the study because the data analysed is 
categorised as cardinal and the computer software applied for this particular analysis SPSS 
(Sekaran, 2003).  
3.7  Data interpretation 
As the research is largely conducted within a positivism paradigm, most interpretations occur 
after data analysis, although some interpretations occurred during the data-collection phase. 
The interpretation bases on the collected facts, identified patterns in the data, individual 
reflections of the researcher and potential connections to the ‗bigger picture‘. 
 
3.8  Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity of the study findings are attained through the application of a 
triangulation of research techniques (Amin, 2006). The panel data upon which the study is 
based is empirical and scientifically gathered by UNCTAD and the World Bank and thus 
enhances the reliability and validity of the study findings (Sekaran, 2003).  
 
3.9  Dissemination of research findings 
The dissemination of the research findings and recommendations is designed to occur 
through various media that include: research reports; journals, newspapers, magazines, 
workshops, conferences, lectures and policy-making institutions among others.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESULTS: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the presentation and discussion of the results of the data analysis. The 
chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 presents the results from the analysis of the 
association among deregulation/regulation, cross-border M&A and FDI based on correlations 
and descriptive statistics. This is followed by Section 4.3, which covers the panel data 
assessment to determine the suitable technique for regressing FDI against the predictor 
variables of the study. The subsequent sections deal with discussions of the results from the 
analysis of the relationship between the criterion and predictor variables of the study.  
 
4.2 Correlations among deregulation/regulation, M&A and FDI 
This section highlights the correlation among deregulation / (regulation); cross-border M&A 
and FDI as a preliminary test of the conceptual framework that motivated this study.  
Business deregulation is alternatively considered as business regulation here in order to 
facilitate easy and clear analysis, interpretation and discussion of results as the two concepts 
are the opposite of one another (i.e. a heavily regulated country is the one with poor/low 
levels of deregulation and the converse is true). Pearson product-moment correlation is 
applied for this purpose and only cross-sectional data of the year 2009 for the sampled 154 
countries is analyzed to emerge with the correlation coefficients shown in Table 4.1 below.   
 
The specific data considered to come up with the coefficients shown in Table 4.1 below are 
derived as follows: business regulation/deregulation is estimated using the country rankings 
on the Ease of Doing Business indices of the World Bank (2010) and cross-border M&As are 
calculated in millions of US dollars of sales realised by each of the sampled 154 countries 
during 2009, as published by UNCTAD in their World Investment Report of 2010.  
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Table 34.1: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for business regulation, 
cross-border M&A and FDI (author’s analysis of data published by UNCTAD, 2010 
and the World Bank, 2010) 
 Country‘s global 
ranking in business 
regulations 
M&As (US$ 
millions) 
FDI inflow 
(US$ 
millions) 
Country‘s global ranking in business 
regulations 
1   
M&As (US$ millions) -0.339
**
 1  
FDI inflow (US$ millions) 
-0.309
**
 0.650
**
 
1 
 
Note: ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level of significance  
 
 
 
From Table 4.1 above it can be noted that the correlation between levels of business 
regulations and cross-border M&A is statistically significant (r = -0.339) at the 0.01 level of 
significance. This implies that as a country deregulates (i.e. eases/reduces/lowers regulation 
levels of) business for the domestic SMEs, it is likely to realise more cross-border M&As.  
 
Table 4.1 also shows that the correlation between cross-border M&A and FDI is statistically 
significant (r = 0.650) at the 0.01 level of significance. This indicates a significant linear 
dependence between FDI and M&A, implying that FDI is bound to increase as M&As 
increase. These results also support the observation that cross-border M&As are a major 
conduit for FDI inflows (UNCTAD, 2008). The correlation between business regulation and 
FDI also proved statistically significant (r= -0.309) at the 0.01 level of significance. Thus, 
FDI is likely to increase as business regulations affecting domestic SMEs decrease (i.e. as 
deregulation improves).  
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Figure 4.1 below shows the variation in the amount of FDI attained by the groups of the 
sampled LICs, MICs and HICs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Figure 4.1 above it is evident that the HICs, which are generally renown for having the 
highest levels of deregulation and M&As (World Bank, 2010), have since 2005 attracted 
considerably more FDI inflows than the LICs, which are generally known for being heavily 
regulated and having minimal M&As (World Bank, 2010). 
 
The results presented above corroborate the conceptual premises upon which this study is 
based. However, it is important to note that the Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients used above do not necessarily imply causation, although they are vital in 
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Figure34.1: Mean FDI inflows attained by the LICs, MICs, and HICs over 
time (author’s analysis of panel data from UNCTAD/World Investment 
Reports, 2006-2010) 
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indicating some relationship among the three key variables of the study. In the subsequent 
sections, other analytical techniques, such as Granger-causality tests, and empirical panel data 
modelling using regressions have been applied to substantiate the preliminary results from the 
correlation test. 
 
4.3 Appraisal of the panel data 
This section presents the results from the appraisal of the panel data assembled for the study 
by checking for normality of data and choosing an appropriate analytical model for 
conducting regressions. The normality of the panel data is checked using a Shapiro-Wilk test 
and the following null hypothesis: Inbound FDI is normally distributed. The result obtained 
from the Shapiro-Wilk test is that the P-value (i.e. Prob > z) = 0.0000 for the inbound FDI 
data. This outcome being less than the 0.05 level of significance implies that the null 
hypothesis has to be rejected (Woodridge, 2009).  
 
Hence, the subsequent model estimations are based on the natural log of FDI (LnFDI). Figure 
4.2 below illustrates how inbound FDI for the panel data is skewed as proved by the Shapiro-
Wilk test, thereby justifying the estimation of the natural log of FDI as the basis for the 
subsequent regressions.    
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Figure44.2: Histogram showing the kurtosis of inbound FDI for the panel data 
(author’s analysis based on the panel data from the World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business database) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the normality of FDI data after transformations using the ln(inbound FDI). 
The Shapiro-Wilk normality test is in other words repeated on the transformed data. This 
0 
.05 
.1 
.15 
.2 
D
e
n
s
it
y
 
0 5 10 15 
LogFDI inflows 
Figure54.3: Histogram of the kurtosis of the natural log of inbound FDI 
(author’s analysis based on World Bank and UNCTAD’s data sets) 
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outcome is then applied in the estimation of regression models so as to come up with reliable 
results. 
 
A Hausman test is employed to compare the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and the Random 
Effects Model (REM) to choose an appropriate model for analysing the panel data. The null 
hypothesis upon which the Hausman test is based: The difference in coefficients is not 
systematic. The results from the Hausman test are provided in Table 4.2 below: 
 
Table44.2: REM and FEM comparative results from the Hausman test (author’s 
analysis based on World Bank and UNCTAD data sets) 
  FEM (b)   REM (B)   b-B Square root of SE (b-B) 
Percentiles of variables of: Coef. Coef.     
Starting a business  
-0.0045 
 
-0.0040 
 
-0.0005 
 (0.0027) 
 
(0.0021) 
  
0.0017 
Paying taxes  
0.0015 
 
0.0041 
 
-0.0026 
 (0.0033) 
 
(0.0022) 
  
0.0025 
Export trading  -0.0044 
 
-0.0097 
 
0.0053 
 
 
(0.0033) 
 
(0.0020) 
  
0.0026 
Constant  3.9712 
 
4.0725 
     (0.2269)   (0.1409)       
sigma_u  0.6980 
 
0.6116 
   sigma_e  0.6363 
 
0.6363 
   rho 0.5461 
 
0.4802 
   rho = fraction of variance due to u_i   
Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors (SE); chi2 (3) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
= 6.32; Prob > chi2 = 0.0970 
 
 
Table 4.2 above shows that the results (p-value) derived from the Hausman test is equal to 
0.0970 (i.e. Prob > chi2 = 0.0970). Such Hausman test results (i.e. p-value = 0.0970) shows 
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance (Woodridge, 
2009). Hence, the Hausman test favours the Random Effects model. On further analysis, the 
variance structure (Ω matrix) of the data could not be established and therefore the Feasible 
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Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) regression technique proved more suitable than the 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) technique as a basis for the REM. The FGLS approach is 
also chosen for this study because it checks for autocorrelation and ensures homoskedasticity 
of panels, among other advantages, as explained in Chapter Three (Greene, 2003).  
 
4.4 Relationships between deregulation of starting a business and FDI 
This section contains a presentation and discussion of results from the investigation of the 
relationship between deregulation of starting a domestic SME business and inbound FDI 
using descriptive statistics, correlations, regressions and Granger causality tests. 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
This sub-section presents a summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables for 
deregulation of starting a business, FDI and cross-border M&A for the 154 countries sampled 
for the study. The statistics derived from the panel data and presented according to the LIC, 
MIC and HIC groupings. Table 4.3 below shows the summary of the descriptive statistics.  
 
The results of the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.3 below depict that countries with 
greater deregulation of starting a business generally realise more monetary values of cross-
border M&As and FDI inflows. Further, the table shows that the LICs (i.e. the most heavily 
regulated countries) have the highest average and absolute procedures (number), time (days), 
cost and minimum capital requirements for starting a business. These LICs are followed by 
the MICs and then the HICs (i.e. the least regulated countries), which have the highest level 
of deregulation of starting a business. Likewise, the average monetary value of cross-border 
M&As and FDI attained by the LICs is the lowest compared to those attained by the MICs 
and the HICs. These findings buttress the conceptual observation of the study that heavily 
regulated countries, the majority of which are LICs, apparently register low FDI inflows as 
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they tend to inhibit the development of their domestic SMEs, hence restraining cross-border 
M&As, which are the major FDI channels. Such empirical evidence corroborates the basic 
inference of the study that deregulation of starting a business has a significant relationship 
with inbound FDI. 
Table54.3: Descriptive statistics of variables for deregulation of starting a business, 
M&As and inbound FDI for the three country groupings (author’s analysis of data 
from the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
Variable Statistic type LICs MICs HICs 
Procedures (number) for starting a business  
Mean 10 9 6 
Standard deviation 4 3 3 
Minimum 1 3 1 
Maximum 19 18 15 
Observations 170 425 175 
Time (days) for starting a business  
Mean 51 41 19 
Standard deviation 44 31 15 
Minimum 3 3 1 
Maximum 203 152 64 
Observations 170 425 175 
Cost (percentage of income per capita) for 
starting a business 
 
Mean 147 41 7 
Standard deviation 191 63 10 
Minimum 5 2 0 
Maximum 1443 643 69 
Observations 170 425 175 
Paid-in minimum capital (percentage of 
income per capita) for starting a business 
 
Mean 205 118 56 
Standard deviation 303 495 139 
Minimum 0 0 0 
Maximum 2158 5112 1237 
Observations 170 425 175 
M&As attained (US$ millions) in 2009 Mean 169 293 6154 
Observations 34 85 35 
FDI inflows (US$ millions) in 2009 Mean 1337 3980 17340 
Observations 34 85 35 
Notes: LICs = Low Income Countries, MICs =Middle Income Countries, and HICs = High Income 
Countries.  
 
 
The variance in the descriptive statistics for the LICs, MICs and HICs shown in Table 4.3 
imply that there is room for improvement by those countries (i.e. LICs) that are heavily 
regulated and thus realising low FDI inflows through cross-border M&As. For instance, the 
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LICs can possibly reduce the average cost of starting a business from 147% to 7% of income 
per capital or less so as to possibly realise greater FDI through increased M&As, as reported 
for the HICs. 
 
Figures 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate the variation in the procedures, time, cost and minimum 
capital for starting a business in the sampled groups of the LICs, MICs and HICs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at Figure 4.4, it is apparent that the number of procedures for starting a business in 
the group of the sampled HICs was a lot less than that of the sampled MICs and LICs. This 
illustration corroborates the results from the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.3 above. 
However, the satisfactory development noticeable in Figure 4.4 above is that these 
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Figure64.4: Comparison of the procedures for starting a business followed in 
the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of the panel data from the World 
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business database) 
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procedures have since 2005 been steadily decreasing in all the economic/income groups of 
the sampled countries.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Figure 4.5 above it is noticeable that the time (days) taken to start a business has been 
considerably less in the sampled HICs since 2005, while the sampled LICs have required the 
most time (days). Here again, the satisfactory trend illustrated by Figure 4.5 above is that the 
time for starting a business has, since 2005, been steadily decreasing in all the 
economic/income groups of the sample countries.    
 
Figure 4.6 below clearly illustrates a marked variance in the cost of starting a business in the 
groups of the sampled LICs, MICs and HICs between 2005 and 2009. This figure 
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Figure74.5: Comparison of time (days) for starting a business in the LICs, 
MICs & HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank’s Ease 
of Doing Business database) 
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substantiates the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.3 above. Satisfactory to note, 
however, is that this cost in the sampled LICs has been reducing at a much faster rate since 
2005 compared to that in the sampled MICs and HICs. If such trends continue, the LICs may 
soon equal MICs and LICs in deregulating this aspect of starting a business.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 below shows that the group of the sampled LICs has since 2005 had the highest 
level of the minimum paid-up capital requirement for starting a business, followed by the 
sampled MICs and then the HICs. This evidence also buttresses the descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 4.3 above.  
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Figure84.6: Comparison of the cost of starting a business incurred in the LICs, 
MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of the panel data from the World Bank’s 
Ease of Doing Business database) 
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From Figure 4.7 it is interesting to note that the trend of the minimum paid-up capital 
required for starting a business in all the sampled LICs, MICs and HICs has been steadily 
decreasing since 2005. However, the sampled HICs indicate the lowest levels of minimum 
capital for starting a business, followed by the MICs; while the LICs have the highest levels. 
 
4.4.2 Pair-wise correlation results  
Pair-wise correlations are vital in so far as they enable the detection of a reasonable degree of 
dependence among the study variables. Table 4.4 below shows the coefficients obtained from 
pair-wise correlation between FDI and the number of procedures; time (days), cost and 
minimum capital for starting a business based on the panel data for the sampled 154 
countries.  
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Figure94.7: Comparison of Minimum Paid-up Capital for Starting a Business 
in the LICs, MICs, and HICs (author’s analysis of the panel data from the 
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business database) 
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From Table 4.4 it can be noted that the correlations between FDI and the procedures, time 
(days) and cost (percentage of income per capita) of starting a business are statistically 
significant with the pair-wise coefficients of -0.1529, -0.1654 and -0.1364, respectively at the 
0.01 level of significance. Thus, statistically, FDI proved significantly inversely proportional 
to the procedures, time (days) and cost of starting a business (Sekaran, 2003). 
 
Table64.4: Pair-wise coefficients for the correlation between FDI and the variables of 
deregulation of starting a business for the sampled 154 countries (author’s analysis of 
panel data provided by the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
 Inbound 
FDI (US$ 
millions) 
 
 
 
Procedures 
(number) 
for starting 
a business 
 
 
Time 
(days) for 
starting a 
business  
 
 
Cost (% 
of income 
per capita) 
of starting 
a business 
 
Minimum 
capital (% 
of income 
per capita) 
for starting 
a business 
Inbound FDI (US$ 
millions) 
1     
     
Procedures (number) 
for starting a 
business 
-0.1529** 1    
(0.0000)     
Time (days) for 
starting a business) 
-0.1654** 0.5437 1   
(0.0000) (0.0000)    
Cost (% of income 
per capita) of starting 
a business 
-0.1364** 0.2648 0.3188 1  
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
Minimum capital (% 
of income per capita) 
for starting a 
business 
-0.0618 0.1655 0.0554 0.1376 1 
(0.0865) (0.0000) (0.1244) (0.0001)  
Checking for multicollinearity = 0 collinearity; 
Number of observations = 770 
Notes: ** = correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed); bracketed figures = p-values  
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This implies that as a country deregulates the procedures, time (days) and cost of starting a 
business, it is likely to realise greater FDI inflows, and vice versa. However, it is vital to note 
that correlation coefficients rather indicate associations between the criterion and predictor 
variables than causal relationships (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
The correlation between FDI and the minimum capital for starting a business was not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. However, the pair-wise coefficient 
resulting from this correlation was negative (r = -0.0618) with a p-value = 0.0865, which is 
closer to the 0.05 level of significance. This implies that the minimum cost for starting a 
business is also inversely proportional to FDI inflows, although it is statistically insignificant.  
 
The results (coefficients) from the pair-wise correlation shown in Table 4.4 above generally 
corroborate the study‘s postulation that there is a significant relationship between 
deregulation of starting a business and inbound FDI. Save for the minimum capital for 
starting a business, the pair-wise coefficients from the correlation between the variables of 
deregulation of starting a business and FDI proved statistically significant at the 0.01 level of 
significance. This indicated that inbound FDI is considerably associated with reduction 
(deregulation) of the procedures, time (days) and cost of starting a business by the domestic 
SME entrepreneurs of a country. 
 
4.4.3 Regression results 
Inbound FDI was regressed against the procedures, time, cost and minimum capital for 
starting a business using cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions of the REM illustrated 
by equation (1') stated below: 
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itititit ddccbbaait
ˆˆˆˆˆˆln 0       (1') 
Where: 
 itˆln  Estimated natural log of the dependent variable (i.e. FDI inflows) 
 
a
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the procedures (number) for  
             starting a business 
 
b
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the time (days) for starting a 
             business 
  c  Estimated regression coefficient for the cost (percentage of income per 
             capita) for starting a business 
  
d
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the time (days) for starting a 
            business  
   a Procedures (number) for starting a business  
 b Time (days) for starting a business   
 c Cost (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business  
 d Minimum capital (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business 
  i = The cross-sectional unit identifier (i.e. individual dimension/countries  
       analysed)  
 t = The time period identifier (i.e. the time dimension/years covered) 
  
The cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions made were based on the percentiles of the 
respective units of measurements for variables considered as given by the sources of the 
panel data. The rationale for using percentiles of variables was based on the prudent 
recommendation of modelling panel data using homogeneous units of measurements 
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(Greene, 2003). However, for the purpose of triangulating the approach used and 
corroborating the results attained, regression based on the respective levels the variables was 
also carried out. The results are as summarised in Table 4.5 below.  
 
Table74.5: Output of FGLS regression of FDI against deregulation of starting a 
business based on percentiles of variables (author’s analysis of panel data provided by 
the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
LnFDI   Coefficient Standard error Z P > /Z/ 
SB_Procedures  0.0060563 0.0015362 3.94 0.000 
SB_Time (days)  -0.0045561 0.001525 -2.99 0.003 
SB_Cost  -0.0105063 0.0013411 -7.83 0.000 
SB_Min. cap  0.0013429 0.0009023 1.49 0.137 
Constant      4.037405 0.0754942 53.48 0.000 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
Wald chi2(4) = 98.23  
Log likelihood = -994.4529  
Estimated autocorrelations = 0 
Number of observations = 770  
Number of groups = 154  
Time periods = 5 
Notes: LnFDI = Natural log of FDI; SB = Starting a business; Min. cap = Minimum paid-up capital  
 
 
From Table 4.5 above, the output of the cross-sectional time series FGLS regression using 
percentiles of the variables shows that, with the p-value (Prob > chi2) = 0.0000, the overall 
model is statistically significant. At a 0.05 level of significance, the explanatory variables that 
proved statistically significant are procedures for starting a business (with a p-value (P > |Z|) 
= 0.000), time (days) for starting a business (with a p-value (P > |Z|) = 0.003) and cost 
(percentage of income per capita) of starting a business (with a p-value (P > |Z| = 0.000). Of 
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these three variables that proved statistically significant, only time (days) and cost of starting 
a business emerged with the expected negative coefficients of -0.0046 and -0.0105, 
respectively. The negative coefficients of these variables indicate that as a country 
deregulates (eases/reduces) the time (days) and cost (percentage of income per capita) for 
starting a business, it is likely to realise greater inbound FDI.  
 
Table 4.5 above shows that from the regression model based on percentiles of observations, 
the cost for starting a business emerged as the most influential and statistically significant 
explanatory variable with a coefficient = -0.0105 and a p-value = 0.000. Procedures for 
starting a business proved to be the second most statistically significant and influential 
explanatory variable with a coefficient = 0.0066 and a p-value = 0.000. However, the 
coefficient for this predictor variable was positive and thus contradictory to the basic 
conceptual postulation of this study. This positive coefficient is probably due to the fact that 
most countries have established one-stop centres for facilitating foreign investors with easy 
and expedited commencement of their businesses (UNCTAD, 2008). The cost (percentage of 
income per capita) for starting a business with a coefficient = -0.0046 and a p-value (P>|Z|) = 
0.003 emerged as the third most influential and statistically significant predictor variable 
under the regression model. Minimum capital for starting, with a positive coefficient = 
0.0013 and a p-value (P>|Z|) = 0.137, proved to be the least influential and it is the only 
statistically insignificant predictor variable at a 0.05 level of significance under the model 
where regressions are based on percentiles of observations.    
 
In order to verify the results shown in Table 4.5 above, a cross-sectional time series FGLS 
random effects regression based on the respective units of measurements (levels) of the 
variables is conducted. The results are as shown in Table 4.6 below. 
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Table84.6: Output of FGLS regression of FDI against deregulation of starting a 
business based on respective levels of variables (author’s analysis of panel data 
provided by the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
LnFDI   Coefficient Standard error Z P>/Z/ 
SB_Procedures  0.0273091 0.0316574 0.86 0.388 
SB_Time (days)  -0.0128593 0.003223 -3.99 0.000 
SB_Cost  -0.0057178 0.000839 -6.82 0.000 
SB_Min. cap  -0.0002313 0.0002228 -1.04 0.299 
Constant      7.519797 0.2490029 30.20 0.000 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
Wald chi2(4) = 87.86 
 Log likelihood = -1659.527  
Estimated autocorrelations = 0 
Number of observations = 770  
Number of groups = 154  
Time periods = 5 
Notes: LnFDI = Natural log of FDI; SB = Starting a business; Min. cap = Minimum paid-up capital  
 
 
Table 4.6 above shows that results from the FGLS regression based on the respective levels 
of variables do not differ much from those presented in Table 4.5.  
 
However, Table 4.6 shows that, where FGLS regressions were based on the levels of the 
variables, time (days) for starting a business, with a coefficient = -0.0128593 and a p-value 
(P>|Z|) = 0.0000, they proved to be more reliable and statistically significant in influencing 
FDI inflows than the cost of starting a business, of which the coefficient was = -0.0057178. 
Table 4.6 shows that procedures and the minimum capital for starting a business did not 
prove statistically significant at 0.05 levels of significance, where FGLS regressions were 
based on the levels of the variables. Hence, the implications of the results shown in Table 4.6, 
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just like for those shown in Table 4.5, are that inbound FDI is bound to increase as the time 
(days) and cost of starting a business by a domestic SME reduce.  
 
In conclusion, the results of the cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions, as shown in 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6, affirm that deregulation of starting a business by a domestic SME 
generally influences inbound FDI. However, only time (days) and cost (percentage of income 
per capita) for starting a business proved to be statistically significant in explaining the 
variance in FDI. Procedures and minimum capital for starting a business did not emerge as 
statistically significant in explaining the variance in FDI, although the minimum cost proved 
inversely proportional to FDI where regressions were based on levels of the variables. These 
results corroborate the study‘s conceptual postulation that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between inbound FDI and the deregulation (reduction) of the time (days) and 
cost of starting a business by domestic SMEs. Thus, heavily regulated countries are likely to 
realise increased FDI inflows as they reduce the time (days) and cost (percentage of income 
per capita) of starting businesses for their respective domestic SME investors. It is, however, 
vital to note that the results of the regressions indicate associations rather than causal 
relationships between criterion and explanatory variables.  
 
4.4.4 Granger causality tests results 
Granger causality tests for the panel data of income (economic) groupings of the 154 
countries sampled for 2006–2009 are carried out to investigate the causal relationships 
between FDI and the variables of deregulation of starting a business by domestic SMEs. The 
specific null hypotheses upon which the Granger causality tests are based are: 
 H01: Number of procedures for starting a business by domestic SME  
          proprietors does not Granger-cause inbound FDI; 
Deregulation, FDI, M&As, and SMEs Page 68 
 
 H02: Time (days) for starting a business by domestic SME proprietors does  
          not Granger-cause inbound FDI; 
 H03: Cost (percentage of income per capita) for starting a business by  
          domestic SME proprietors does not Granger-cause inbound FDI 
 H04 : Minimum paid-up capital (percentage of income per capita) for starting  
          a business by domestic SME proprietors does not Granger-cause FDI         
 
The null hypotheses stated above are equivalent to interpreting asymptotic F-test of joint 
significance. In all cases, the null hypothesis can be accepted only where the asymptotic p-
value (Prob > chi2) is greater than 0.05 (asymptotic p > 0.05) and rejected where the p-value 
(Prob > chi2) is less than 0.05 (asymptotic p < 0.05). 
 
The results of the Granger causality tests based on the null hypotheses H01, H02, H03 and H04 
stated above for the sampled groups of LICs, MICs and HICs are as detailed in Tables 4.7, 
4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 and as summarised in Table 4.11. 
Table94.7: Granger causality test results for the number of procedures for starting a 
business and FDI in the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the 
World Bank and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F(1, 1) Prob>F Chi2(1) Prob>chi2 
LICs 0.10 0.8086 0.38 0.5353 
MICs  34.07 0.1080 136.26 0.000** 
HICs  0.99 0.5012 3.97 0.0463* 
Number of observations = 4 
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.05 level of significance; ** 
denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.01 level of significance 
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Table 4.7 above shows that procedures for starting a business Granger-cause inbound FDI in 
the sampled groups of the MICs and HICs.  
 
Table104.8: Granger causality test results for the time (days) of starting a business and 
FDI in the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank 
and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs 0.03 0.8851 0.13 0.7152 
MICs  1.25 0.4652 4.98 0.0256* 
HICs  1.02 0.4971 4.07 0.0436* 
Number of observations = 4 
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.05 level of significance; ** 
denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.01 level of significance 
 
From Table 4.8 above it is clear that the time (days) for starting a domestic SME Granger-
causes inbound FDI in the sampled groups of the MICs and HICs.  
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Table114.9: Granger causality test results for the cost of starting a business and FDI in 
the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank and 
UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs 0.07 0.8318 0.29 0.5884 
MICs  1.68 0.4182 6.73 0.0095** 
HICs  0.25 0.7040 1.01 0.3157 
Number of observations = 4 
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.05 level of significance; ** 
denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.01 level of significance 
 
 
The results presented in Table 4.9 above show that the costs of starting domestic SMEs 
Granger-causes inbound FDI in only the sampled group of MICs.  
 
Table124.10: Granger causality test results for the minimum capital for starting a 
business and FDI in the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the 
World Bank and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs 0.12 0.7856 0.49 0.4838 
MICs  4.18 0.2897 16.70 0.0000** 
HICs  1.17 0.4746 4.69 0.0303* 
Number of observations = 4 
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.05 level of significance; ** 
denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.01 level of significance 
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From Table 4.10 above it is apparent that the minimum paid-up capital (as a percentage of 
income per capita) officially required for starting a domestic SME Granger-causes inbound 
FDI in the groups of the sampled MICs and HICs.  
 
Table134.11: summary of the results (p-values) from the Granger causality tests for the 
variables of deregulation of starting a business and FDI in the LICs, MICs and HICs 
(author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Variable Sub-variables LICs MICs HICs 
Deregulation of Starting a 
business 
Procedures 0.5353 0.000** 0.0463* 
Time (days) 0.7152 0.0256* 0.0436* 
Cost 0.5884 0.0095** 0.3157 
Min. capital 0.4838 0.000** 0.0303* 
Number of observations = 4 
 Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Notes: * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.05 level of significance; ** 
denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality at the 0.01 level of significance 
 
Tables: 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 above show diverse Granger causality results that pose 
various implications for policy reforms in the LICs, MICs and HICs, as discussed below.  
 
Tables: 4.7 and 4.11 show that it is only in the MICs and HICs where procedures for starting 
a domestic business Granger-cause inbound FDI. This implies that for the LICs to realise 
greater FDI inflows through reducing the number of procedures for starting a business, they 
may need to first redress other FDI-deterrent factors that exclusively concern them, as 
identified by Dunning and Narula (1996), such as poor physical infrastructure, small 
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domestic markets, relatively higher levels of insecurity and political instability, among other 
factors. 
 
The time (days) for starting a business proves to Granger-cause inbound FDI in only the 
MICs and HICs, as shown by the results in tables 4.8 and 4.11. This implies that LICs 
possibly have other unique characteristics or factors that deter increased FDI inflows accruing 
from the deregulation (reduction) of the time (days) for starting a business, as the case is in 
the MICs and HICs. Some of these LICs‘ unique hindrances to FDI have been identified by 
Fry (1983) and include a relatively unpredictable political environment, low aggregate 
demand and negative attitude of the indigenous citizens, among other factors. 
 
Tables 4.9 and 4.11 show that the cost (percentage of income per capita) for starting a 
domestic SME Granger-cause inbound FDI in only the MICs, but not in the LICs and HICs 
whereas Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show that the minimum paid-up capital (percentage of income 
per capita) for starting a business Granger-causes inbound FDI in only MICs and HICs, but 
not in the LICs. 
 
In conclusion, the results from the Granger causality tests presented in Tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 
4.10 and 4.11 show that all the explanatory variables of deregulation of starting a business 
Granger-cause inbound FDI in the middle income countries. For the sampled HICs, only the 
procedures, time (days) and minimum capital for starting businesses Granger-cause inbound 
FDI, but the cost of starting a business does not. In the sampled LICs, however, none of the 
four explanatory variables of starting a business Granger-causes inbound FDI. The reason for 
this variation of results among the three country groupings may be attributed to the 
observation that factors that lead to FDI inflows tend to be country-specific (Dunning & 
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Narula, 1996). Dunning and Narula also observe that LICs generally have extraordinary 
deterrents to FDI inflows, as explained above, which possibly explain the failure of any of the 
four variables to Granger-cause FDI in the LICs, as shown by the results above. Hence, if all 
countries are to realise FDI inflows resulting from deregulation of starting domestic SME 
businesses, as proved for the MICs, there is a need for each country to mitigate its exclusive 
disincentives to FDI inflows. Examples of such FDI disincentives include various magnitudes 
and impacts of corruption, limited markets/demand, nepotism, armed conflicts and political 
upheavals, which characterise several LICs of especially sub-Saharan Africa (Chakrabarti, 
2001).    
 
4.4.5 Empirical substantiation 
This sub-section contains a presentation and discussion of the empirical facts on deregulation 
of starting a business, cross-border M&As and inbound FDI, as given by the World Bank 
(2010) and UNCTAD (2010), which substantiate and corroborate the results presented in sub-
sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 above.  
 
 
Empirical data from the Ease of Doing Business database (2010) and the World Investment 
Report of 2010 indicate that countries that rank high in the deregulation of starting a business 
do realise greater cross-border M&As and more inbound FDI than their counterparts. This 
evidence is shown in Table 4.12 below. 
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Table144.12: Cross-border M&As and FDI realized by countries with the highest and 
lowest deregulation of starting a business in 2009 (empirical data from the World Bank 
2010 and UNCTAD 2010) 
Countries with the highest deregulation of 
starting a business  
 
Countries with the lowest deregulation of 
starting a business 
Country Global 
rank 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
 
Country Global 
rank 
 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
New Zealand 1 126 348 Cameroon 174 0 337 
Canada 2 11 389 18 657  Iraq 175 0 1 070 
Australia 3 22 206 22 572  Palestine 176 0 33 
Singapore 4 9 693 16 809  Djibouti 177 0 0 
Georgia 
5 14 764  Equatorial 
Guinea 
178 0 0 
Macedonia, 
FYR 
6 0 248  Guinea 179 0 141 
Belarus 7 0 1 863  Haiti 180 1 38 
USA 8 40 085 129 883  Eritrea 181 0 0 
Ireland 9 1 712 24 971  Chad 182 0 462 
Mauritius 10 24 27  Guinea-
Bissau 
183 0 0 
Average/Mean 8 525 21 614  Average/Mean 0 208 
Notes: M&A = Cross-border mergers and acquisitions; Global rank refers to a country‘s global 
position regarding deregulation of starting a business as given by the World Bank in 2009  
 
 
Table 4.12 above shows that, in year 2009,  the FDI attained by the 10 best-ranked countries 
on deregulation of starting a business was, on average, much greater (US$21 614 million) 
than that attained by the 10 worst-ranked countries (US$208 million). The table also shows 
that the best-ranked countries realised a much higher average monetary value of cross-border 
M&As (US$8 525 million) than that realised by 10 worst-ranked countries. These empirical 
facts considerably uphold the study‘s postulation that deregulation of starting domestic SMEs 
has a significant relationship with greater FDI inflows, especially through cross-border 
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M&As. Hence, countries are likely to realise greater inbound FDI, especially through cross-
border M&As, if they competitively deregulate the starting of their ordinary domestic SMEs.  
 
4.5 Relationships between deregulation of paying taxes and FDI 
 
This section covers the presentation and discussion of the results from the investigation of the 
relationship between inbound FDI and the deregulation of paying taxes by the domestic 
SMEs.  
 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
This sub-section presents a summary of the descriptive statistics (means/averages) of the 
variables for deregulation of paying taxes, FDI and cross-border M&As for the sampled 
LICs, MICs and HICs derived from the study‘s panel data. Table 4.13 below shows the 
summary of these descriptive statistics.  
 
The results of the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.13 below indicate that countries with 
greater deregulation of paying taxes realise more monetary values of cross-border M&As and 
FDI inflows on average. The table also shows that the sampled LICs (i.e. the most heavily 
regulated countries) have the highest average number (forms) of taxes, time (hours) for 
paying taxes and total tax rates payable by domestic SMEs. The sampled HICs (i.e. the most 
deregulated countries) have the lowest averages of number (forms) of taxes, time (hours) 
spent paying taxes and total tax rate payable by domestic SMEs.  
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Table154.13: Descriptive statistics (mean) of variables for deregulation of paying taxes, 
M&As and inbound FDI for the various country groupings (author’s analysis of data 
from the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
Variables Country groupings Mean 
Forms (number) of taxes paid per year  
LICs  40.25294 
MICs  37.69412 
HICs  15.66857 
Time (hours) spent on payment of taxes 
LICs  289.7206 
MICs  407.0188 
HICs  204.2229 
The total tax rate (% of profits) payable by 
each business per year 
LICs  67.37647 
MICs  46.46729 
HICs  42.02486 
M&As attained (US$ millions) in 2009 
LICs  168.9 
MICs  293.5 
HICs  6 154.0 
FDI inflows (US$ millions) in 2009 
LICs  1 337.4 
MICs  3 979.6 
HICs  17 340.0 
 
 
 
Table 4.13 above shows that the average monetary value of cross-border M&As and FDI 
attained by the LICs is the lowest compared to that attained by the MICs and the HICs. These 
results support the conceptual premises of the study that highly deregulated countries, 
represented by the group of the sampled HICs in this study, ostensibly attain higher levels of 
FDI inflows than their counterparts. Thus the results from the descriptive statistics shown in 
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Table 4.13 are preliminary indications of a statistically significant relationship between 
inbound FDI and the deregulation of paying taxes by the domestic SMEs of any country. The 
descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.13 are substantiated by the graphical illustrations of 
the variance in number of taxes, time for paying taxes and the total rates in the sampled LICs, 
MICs and HICs, shown in Figures: 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 clearly shows that the number (forms) of taxes paid by domestic SMEs of the 
sampled HICs has distinctly been considerably less than that imposed in the groups of the 
sampled MICs and LICs since 2005. Furthermore, between 2005 and 2009, the number of 
taxes payable in the sampled MICs and LICs was almost equally high, although that of the 
LICs was higher. According to Figure 4.8, the trend of the number of taxes payable in the 
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Figure104.8: Comparison of forms of taxes paid in the LICs, MICs and HICs 
(author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
database) 
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sampled LICs unfortunately appears to be rising since 2007, while that of the MICs and HICs 
is lowering. This implies that the LICs ought to seriously embark on deregulation of paying 
taxes if they are to competitively realise greater FDI inflows, particularly through cross-
border mergers and acquisitions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Figure 4.9 it is evident that the time (hours) spent on paying taxes is the longest 
(slowest) in the sampled LICs, followed by that in the sampled MICs, and the shortest 
(fastest/least) in the sampled HICs. The figure also shows a considerable variance between 
the time spent on paying taxes in the sampled LICs and HICs. However, the time for paying 
taxes has been decreasing since 2006 in all the sampled groups of the LICs, MICs and HICs.   
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Figure114.9: Comparison of time (hours) spent paying taxes in the LICs, MICs 
and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business database) 
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Figure 4.10 below shows that the sampled LICs have the highest levels of total tax rates, 
followed by the MICs, while the sampled HICs have the lowest levels. This probably 
explains why most domestic SMEs in the LICs are stunted and consequently unable to spur 
FDI inflows through cross-border mergers and acquisitions.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 clearly shows that whereas the tax rates have been declining in the sampled MICs 
and HICs, the sampled LICs experience rising total tax rates, which further inhibits 
opportunities for increased M&As and accompanying FDI inflows. Hence, there is a need for 
concerted measures to deregulate (reduce) the total tax rate imposed on the domestic SMEs of 
especially the LICs to enhance their prospects for attracting substantial M&As and 
consequently increasing FDI inflows. 
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Figure124.10: Comparison of the total tax rates for the LICs, MICs and HICs 
(author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
database) 
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4.5.2 Pair-wise correlation results 
Pair-wise correlations based on the panel data for the sampled 154 countries were done to 
substantiate the results from the descriptive statistics stated in sub-section 4.5.1. Table 4.14 
below shows the coefficients obtained from the pair-wise correlation between inbound FDI 
and the number (forms) of taxes, time (hours) spent paying taxes and the total tax rate faced 
by domestic SMEs of the sampled countries.  
 
Table164.14: Pair-wise coefficients for the correlations between FDI inflows and the 
sub-variables of deregulation of paying taxes (author’s analysis of panel data provided 
by the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
  
Inbound 
FDI 
Number (forms) 
of taxes paid per 
year 
Time (hours) 
spent paying 
taxes 
Total tax rate 
(% of profit) 
Inbound FDI  
1 
 
   
Number (forms) of 
taxes paid per year 
-0.2182** 
(0.0000) 
1   
Time (hours) spent 
paying taxes 
-0.0233 
(0.5179) 
0.2317** 
(0.0000) 
1  
Total tax rate (% of 
profit) 
-0.0139 
(0.6992) 
0.2095** 
(0.0000) 
0.1617** 
(0.0000) 
1 
 Number of observations = 770 
 Checking for multicollinearity = 0 collinearity 
Notes: ** denotes significance at the level = 0.01; bracketed values = p-values 
 
From Table 4.14 it is clear that the number (forms) of taxes paid per year is the only 
explanatory sub-variable of deregulation of paying taxes that statistically proves significantly 
correlated to inbound FDI at a 0.01 level of significance with a negative coefficient =  
-0.2182. Hence, statistically, the number (forms) of taxes payable by domestic SMEs per year 
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is significantly inversely proportional to inbound FDI (Sekaran, 2003). That implies that as a 
country deregulates (eases/reduces) the number of taxes payable by its domestic SMEs, it is 
likely to realise greater FDI inflows, and vice versa. However, it is important to observe that 
correlation coefficients indicate associations rather than causal relationships between the 
variables correlated (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
Pair-wise correlation between FDI and the time (hours) spent paying taxes and the total tax 
rate imposed on domestic SMEs are not statistically significant at a 0.05 level of significance. 
However the pair-wise coefficients resulting from this correlation were negative (r = -0.0233 
for the time spent paying taxes and r = -0.0139 for the total tax rate), which implies a 
converse proportionality between FDI and these two sub-variables of deregulation of paying 
taxes. The statistical insignificance of the pair-wise correlation between FDI and the total tax 
rate is substantiated by the findings of a study by Davies (2004) that total tax rates have never 
empirically proven to deter FDI inflows. 
 
In conclusion, the only explanatory sub-variable of deregulation of paying taxes that has a 
statistically significant relationship with inbound FDI is the number (forms) of taxes payable 
per year by domestic SMEs. However, the negative coefficients from the pair-wise 
correlation between FDI and all the three explanatory sub-variables of deregulation of paying 
taxes for the countries sampled imply that FDI inflow is expected to increase as each of these 
explanatory variables decreases. These results generally uphold the study‘s conceptual 
observation that deregulation of paying taxes apparently leads to increased FDI inflows.  
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4.5.3 Regression results 
Inbound FDI was regressed against the sub-variables of deregulation of paying taxes 
considered for this study using an estimated cross-sectional time series FGLS of the REM 
represented by equation (2') below: 
 
Estimated REM of FDI regressed on deregulation of paying taxes 
ititit ggffeeit
ˆˆˆˆˆln 0          (2') 
Where: 
 itˆln  Estimated natural log of FDI inflows  
 
e
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficients for the number of tax payments per  
            year 
 f
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for time (hours) spent paying taxes per  
            year   
 g
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the total tax rate (percentage of profit) 
 e Number of tax payments per year  
 f Time (hours) spent on paying taxes per year 
 g Total tax rate (percentage of profit)  
 i = The cross-sectional unit identifier (i.e. individual dimension/countries  
        analysed)  
 t = The time period identifier (i.e. the time dimension/years covered) 
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The cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions done were based on the percentiles of the 
respective units of measurements for the variables considered, as given by the sources of the 
panel data. Percentiles of variables were chosen for this regression because it is prudent and 
recommendable to apply uniform units of measurements while modelling panel data (Greene, 
2003). However, for the sake of triangulating the approach used and corroborating the results 
attained, regressions based on the respective levels the variables was also done. The results of 
the cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions using percentiles of the studied variables are 
presented in Table 4.15 below. 
 
Table174.15: Output of the cross-sectional time series of FGLS regression of FDI 
against variables of deregulation of paying taxes using percentiles of observations 
(author’s analysis of panel data provided by the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
LnFDI  Coefficient Standard error Z P > /Z/ 
Number (forms) of taxes  -0.0038249 0.0012342 -3.10 0.002 
Time (hours) for paying taxes  0.0038836 0.001244 3.12 0.002 
Total tax rate  0.0001031 0.0012403 0.08 0.934 
Constant      3.611214 0.0852901 42.34 0.000 
             Prob > chi2 = 0.0013  
             Wald chi2(3) =  15.71 
             Log likelihood = -1032.904 
             Estimated autocorrelations = 0  
Number of observations = 770  
Number of groups = 154  
Time periods = 5 
 
 
 
Table 4.15 above shows that the overall model for the cross-sectional time series FGLS 
regression based on the percentiles of variables is statistically significant with a p-value (Prob 
> chi2) = 0.0013. The table also shows that there is no autocorrelation in deriving the 
regression results and hence the results presented are reliable.  
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From Table 4.15 it can be noted that the number (forms) of taxes is the only explanatory 
component/sub-variable of deregulation of paying taxes that has a negative coefficient (i.e.  
-0.0038249) that is statistically significant at a 0.01 level of significance. Thus, the number 
(forms) of taxes is the only sub-variable of deregulation of paying taxes that is inversely 
proportional to FDI inflows and statistically significant in explaining the variance in inbound 
FDI. It is however important to note that, given the miniature magnitude of its coefficient  
(-0.0038249), the number (forms) of taxes, as a predictor variable, has a very small variation 
impact on inbound FDI. This is possibly due to the fact that inbound FDI is often caused by 
interplay of a numerous factors (UNCTAD, 2007). Nevertheless, this outcome serves as yet 
another basis for rejecting the corresponding null hypothesis of the study (i.e. H0b1: There is 
no significant relationship between the number of tax payments and inbound FDI). 
   
Table 4.15 shows that the time (hours) for paying taxes is statistically significant at a 0.01 
level of significance, but has a positive coefficient (0.0038836), which contradicts the study‘s 
basic conception of this variable as a predictor of FDI inflows.  
 
In order to corroborate the regression results presented in Table 4.15 above, another 
regression based on cross-sectional time series FGLS of the REM, using the respective units 
of measurements (levels) of the variables, was done. The results are presented in Table 4.16. 
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Table184.16: Output of FGLS regression of FDI against deregulation of paying taxes 
based on the respective units of measurements (levels) of variables (author’s analysis of 
panel data provided by the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
LnFDI  Coefficient Standard error Z P > /Z/ 
Number (forms) of taxes  -0.0225184 0.0041658 -5.41 0.000 
Time (hours) for paying taxes  0.0012262 0.000284 4.32 0.000 
Total tax rate  -0.0050911 0.0024967 -2.04 0.041 
Constant      7.532744 0.192861 39.06 0.000 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
Wald chi2(3) = 46.81 
 Log likelihood = -1678.32 
 Estimated autocorrelations = 0 
Number of observations = 770  
Number of groups = 154  
Time periods = 5 
 
 
Table 4.16 shows that results from regressions based on the levels of variables are more 
reliable and supportive of the study‘s postulations than those from regressions based on 
percentiles of observations. For instance, the results for the overall model shown in Table 
4.16 is significant with a p-value (Prob > chi2) = 0.0000 compared to the model presented in 
Table 4.15, of which the p-value (Prob > chi2) = 0.0013. Table 4.16 also shows that where 
FGLS regressions are based on the levels of the variables, both the number (forms) of taxes 
and the total tax rate are statistically significant and have negative regression coefficients of  
-0.0225184 and -0.0050911, respectively. This implies that where regressions are based on 
the levels of the variables, the number of taxes and total tax rate are inversely proportional to 
FDI, which concurs with the conceptual background of the study. Under the same regression 
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approach, time (hours) for paying taxes is statistically significant but has a positive regression 
coefficient (0.0012262).  
 
In conclusion, the results from the regressions where variables are estimated in both 
percentiles and levels show that the number of taxes paid by domestic SMEs of the sampled 
countries per year is statistically significant and inversely proportional to inbound FDI. Both 
time (hours) for paying taxes and the total tax rate are statistically significant where 
regressions where based on levels of the variables, but only the total tax rate emerges as 
inversely proportional to inbound FDI. Hence, there is a statistically reliable relationship 
between the number (forms) of taxes and the total tax rate payable by the domestic SMEs of 
the sampled countries per year, which buttresses the study‘s primary conception regarding 
this relationship. However, this relationship does not necessarily mean that the explanatory 
variables here do cause inbound FDI, as regressions indicate more of associations than causal 
relationships (Sekaran, 2003).  
 
4.5.4 Granger causality tests results 
Granger causality tests for the panel data of the sampled LICs, MICs and HICs for the period 
2006–2009 are carried out to investigate the causal relationships between FDI and the sub-
variables of deregulation of paying taxes. The null hypotheses upon which the Granger 
causality tests are based are the following: 
 H0a: Number of taxes paid per year by domestic SMEs does not Granger-  
          cause inbound FDI 
 H0b: Time (hours) spent paying taxes by domestic SMEs does not Granger-  
           cause inbound FDI 
 H0c: The total tax rate (percentage of profit) imposed on domestic SMEs does  
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          not Granger-cause inbound FDI  
The null hypotheses stated above are equivalent to interpreting asymptotic F-test of joint 
significance. In all cases, the null hypothesis can be accepted only where the asymptotic p-
value (Prob > chi2) is greater than 0.05 (asymptotic p > 0.05) and rejected where the p-value 
(Prob > chi2) is less than 0.05 (asymptotic p < 0.05). 
 
The results of the Granger causality tests based on the null hypotheses H0a, H0b, and H0c 
stated above for the sampled groups of low, middle and high income countries are as detailed 
in Tables: 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19 and as summarised in Table 4.20 below. 
 
Table194.17: Granger causality test results for the number (forms) of taxes paid per 
year and inbound FDI for the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data 
from the World Bank and UNCTAD 2006–2009)  
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs  0.28 0.6880 1.14 0.2859 
MICs  1.59 0.4266 6.37 0.0116** 
HICs  1.21 0.4698 4.84 0.0279** 
Number of observations = 4 
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Note: ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality  
 
Table 4.17 shows that the number of taxes payable by a country‘s domestic SMEs per year 
Granger-causes inbound FDI in the sampled MICs and HICs.   
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Table204.18: Granger causality test results for the time (hours) spent paying taxes and 
inbound FDI for the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the 
World Bank and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs  8.52 0.2102 34.07 0.0000** 
MICs  38.03 0.1023 152.11 0.0000** 
HICs  5.29 0.2611 21.16 0.0000** 
Number of observations = 4 
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Note: ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality  
 
 
From Table 4.18 it is evident that time (hours) spent paying taxes by domestic SMEs per year 
Granger-causes inbound FDI in all the sampled groups of the LICs, MICs and HICs. 
 
Table214.19: Granger causality test results for the total tax rate and inbound FDI for 
the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank and 
UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs  0.03 0.8895 0.12 0.7259 
MICs  6.84 0.2325 27.37 0.0000** 
HICs  5.48 0.2570 21.92 0.0000** 
Number of observations = 4 
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Note: ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality  
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Table 4.19 shows that the total tax rate imposed on domestic SMEs per year Granger-causes 
inbound FDI in only the sampled middle and high income countries. 
 
Table224.20: Summary of results (p-values) from the Granger causality tests for the 
deregulation of paying taxes and FDI for LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of 
panel data from the World Bank and UNCTAD, 2006–2009) 
Variable Sub-variable LICs MICs HICs 
Deregulation 
of paying 
Taxes 
Number (forms) 0.2859 0.0116** 0.0279** 
Time (hours) 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
Total tax rate 0.7259 0.0000** 0.0000** 
Number of observations = 4 
 Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Note: ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality;  
 
Tables: 4.17 and 4.20 show the results from the Granger causality tests, indicating that the 
number of taxes paid per year by domestic SMEs Granger-causes inbound FDI in only the 
sampled middle and high income countries but not in the sampled LICs. These results 
therefore imply that the null hypothesis H0a (i.e. number of taxes paid per year by domestic 
SMEs does not Granger- cause inbound FDI) was rejected for the sampled groups of the 
middle and high income countries but accepted for the sampled low income countries.  
 
 
Tables: 4.18 and 4.20 show that the time (hours) spent paying taxes by domestic SMEs 
Granger-causes inbound FDI in all the three groups of the sampled low, middle and high 
income countries. This means that the null hypothesis H0b (i.e. time (hours) spent while 
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paying taxes by domestic SMEs does not Granger-cause inbound FDI) was rejected for all the 
three economic groupings of the sampled countries. 
 
Tables 4.19 and 4.20 show the results from the Granger causality tests indicating that the total 
tax rate (percentage of profit) imposed on domestic SMEs Granger-causes inbound FDI in 
only the sampled MICs and HICs but not in the LICs. Hence, the corresponding null 
hypothesis H0c (i.e. the total tax rate (percentage of profit) imposed on domestic SMEs does 
not Granger-cause inbound FDI) is accepted for only the sampled LICs but rejected for the 
sampled MICs and HICs.  
 
The failure to reject the null hypotheses H0a and H0c for the sampled LICs is possibly 
because such countries have exceptional characteristics that cause them to fail to attract FDI 
inflows through conventional measures that prove effective in the middle and high income 
countries (UNCTAD, 2007). In summary, the results from the Granger causality tests 
generally show that all the components (sub-variables) of deregulation of paying taxes 
Granger-cause inbound FDI in the sampled LICs, MICs and HICs except for the number 
(forms) of taxes and total tax rate applied in the sampled LICs.  
 
4.5.5 Empirical substantiation 
This sub-section covers a comparative analysis of empirical data on deregulation of paying 
taxes, cross-border M&As and inbound FDI, as presented by the World Bank (2010) and 
UNCTAD (2010) that substantiate the results presented in sub-sections: 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3 
and 4.5.4.  
 
Empirical data from the Ease of Doing Business database (2010) and the World Investment 
Report of 2010 show that countries that rank high in the deregulation of paying taxes do 
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attain more cross-border M&As and greater inbound FDI than their counterparts. This 
empirical evidence is illustrated in Table 4.21 below. 
 
Table234.21: Cross-border M&As and FDI realised by countries with the highest and 
lowest deregulation of paying taxes in 2009 (empirical data from the World Bank 2010 
and UNCTAD 2010) 
Countries with the highest deregulation of 
paying taxes 
 
Countries with the lowest deregulation of 
paying taxes 
Country Global 
rank 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
 
Country Global 
rank 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
Maldives 1 3 10 Jamaica 174 0 1 062 
Qatar 2 298 8722  Mauritania 175 0 -36 
Hong 
Kong 
China 3 3 028 48449 
 Gambia 176 0 47 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 4 300 4003 
 Bolivia 177 24 423 
Singapore  5 9 693 16809  Uzbekistan 178 4 750 
Ireland 6 1 712 24971 
 Central 
African Rep. 
179 0 42 
Saudi 
Arabia 7 42 35514 
 Congo, Rep. 180 0 2 083 
Oman 8 10 2211  Ukraine 181 147 4 816 
New 
Zealand 9 126 348 
 Venezuela 182 0 -3105 
Kiribati 10 0 2  Belarus 183 0 1 863 
Average 1 521.2 14 103.9 
 
Average 17.5 794.5 
 
 
Table 4.21 shows that in year 2009, the 10 countries that ranked highest/best on deregulation 
of paying taxes attained much higher averages of M&As and FDI (US$1 521.2 million and 
US$14 103.9 million, respectively) than those attained by the 10 lowest/worst-ranked 
countries (US$17.5 million for M&As and US$1 794.5 million for FDI). These empirical 
facts significantly corroborate and substantiate the basic presupposition of the study that 
deregulation of paying taxes by the domestic SMEs is significantly related to inbound FDI 
and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Hence, countries are likely to realise greater 
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inbound FDI, especially through cross-border M&As, if they deregulate the payment of taxes 
by their respective domestic SMEs.  
 
4.6 Relationships between deregulation of export trading and FDI 
 
This section contains a presentation and discussion of the results from the investigation of the 
relationship between inbound FDI and the deregulation of export trading by the domestic 
SMEs of the sampled countries.  
 
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
This sub-section presents a summary of the descriptive statistics (means/averages) of the 
variables for deregulation of export trading by domestic SMEs, inbound FDI and cross-
border M&As for the sampled 154 countries. The statistics are derived from the panel data 
devised for the study and presented according to the LIC, MIC and HIC groupings. Table 
4.22 below shows the summary of the descriptive statistics.  
 
The results of the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.22 show that countries with higher 
levels of deregulation of export trading attain greater monetary values of cross-border M&As 
and FDI inflows on average. According to Table 4.22, the sampled LICs have the highest 
averages of export documents, time (days) for exporting and cost (US$) of exporting a 20-
feet container of goods by the domestic SMEs. Further, the sampled HICs have the lowest 
averages of export documents, time (days) for exporting and cost of exporting experienced by 
the domestic SMEs.  
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Table244.22: Descriptive statistics of variables for deregulation of exporting, M&As and 
inbound FDI for the various country groupings (author’s analysis of data from the 
World Bank and UNCTAD) 
Variables Country groupings Mean Standard error 
Number of official 
documents for exporting 
 
LICs  8.6 0.2 
MICs  7.4 0.1 
HICs  5.1 0.3 
Time (days) taken to export a 
container of goods 
 
LICs  44.9 1.6 
MICs  28.2 0.8 
HICs  11.9 0.5 
Cost (US$) of exporting a 
container of goods 
 
LICs  1879.2 82.1 
MICs  1224.0 38.0 
HICs  876.5 24.4 
M&As attained (US$ 
millions) for only 2009  
 
LICs  168.9  
MICs  293.5  
HICs  6154.0  
FDI inflows (US$ millions) 
for only 2009 
 
LICs  1337.4  
MICs  3979.6  
HICs  17340.0  
Number of observations = 770 
 
 
 
Table 4.22 shows that the sampled LICs have the lowest averages of monetary value of cross-
border M&As and FDI. These are followed by the sampled MICs, while the sampled HICs 
bear the highest averages. These results support the conceptual presupposition of the study 
that highly deregulated countries, represented by the group of the sampled HICs in this study, 
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ostensibly attain higher levels of FDI inflows than their counterparts. Hence, the results from 
the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.22 serve as a preliminary indication of statistical 
significance and inverse proportionality between inbound FDI and the deregulation of export 
trading by the domestic SMEs of any country. Other findings to corroborate this fact are 
presented in the sub-sections below. 
 
 
Figures: 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 illustrate the variations in the number of documents, time and 
cost of exporting a standard container of goods by the domestic SMEs of the sampled LICs, 
MICs and HICs, respectively.   
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Figure134.11: Comparison of export documents completed in the LICs, MICs 
and HICs (author’s analysis of the panel data from the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business database) 
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Figure 4.11 shows that the sampled HICs have the lowest levels (number) of documents to be 
completed by SME exporters. This group is followed by the sampled MICs, while the LICs 
have the highest levels (number) of such documents. However, it is evident from Figure 4.11 
that in all three groups of the sampled countries, the numbers of documents for exporting are 
steadily reducing, although this reduction is most pronounced in the sampled HICs.    
 
 
 
 
Figure  
 
Figure 4.12 shows that the time (days) spent exporting a standard container of goods is the 
longest (slowest) in the sampled LICs, followed by that of the MICs, while that of the 
sampled HICs is the shortest. This illustration supports the respective descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 4.22 above.   
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Figure144.12: Comparison of time (days) for exporting in the LICs, MICs and 
HICs (author’s analysis of the panel data from the World Bank‘s Ease of Doing 
Business database) 
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However, Figure 4.12 shows that the time (days) spent on exporting has since 2005 been on a 
steady and impressive down-ward trend in all the sampled low, middle and high income 
countries. This implies that each country needs to aggressively compete in the deregulation 
(reduction) of such time (days) to gain advantage over others in respect of attracting more 
cross-border M&As and FDI inflows.   
 
 
 
 
Figure  
Figure 4.13 shows that the cost of exporting a standard container of goods is highest in the 
sampled LICs, followed by that of the MICs, while the HICs have the least cost. These 
findings bolster the descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.22 above. Unfortunately, Figure 
4.13 also shows that this exporting cost has been generally rising in all groups of the sampled 
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Figure154.13: Comparison of cost of exporting incurred in the LICs, MICs and 
HICs (author’s analysis of the panel data from the World Bank’s Ease of 
Doing Business database) 
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countries since 2006. This is probably due to the general inflation and economic crisis that 
have been experienced by most countries since 2006 (World Bank, 2009).   
 
4.6.2 Correlation results 
Correlations are important in so far as they facilitate the detection of a significant degree of 
dependence among the study variables. Such correlations are carried out to substantiate the 
implications of the descriptive statistics regarding the relationship between FDI and 
deregulation of export trading, as discussed in Section 4.6.1. Table 4.23 below shows the 
coefficients obtained from the pair-wise correlation between inbound FDI and the number 
(forms) of export documents, time (days) for exporting and the cost of exporting a container 
of goods by domestic SMEs. The correlation results shown in Table 4.23 are derived from the 
panel data for the 154 countries sampled for this study.  
 
Table254.23: Pair-wise coefficients for the correlations between FDI inflows and 
deregulation of export trading variables (author’s analysis of panel data provided by 
the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
 
Inbound FDI Documents 
(number) for 
exporting 
Time (days) 
for exporting 
Cost of 
exporting  
Inbound FDI  
 
1    
Documents (number) for 
exporting 
-0.2187** 
(0.0000) 
 
1   
Time (days) for 
exporting 
-0.2343** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.5184** 
(0.0000) 
1  
Cost of exporting -0.1153** 
(0.0014) 
0.2739** 
(0.0000) 
0.6085** 
(0.0000) 
1 
 Number of observations = 770 
 Checking for multicollinearity = 0 (zero collinearity) 
Notes: ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; bracketed values = p-values 
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According to Table 4.23 there are statistically significant negative correlations between FDI 
and all the components (sub-variables) of deregulation of export trading (i.e. the documents: -
0.2187, time: -0.2343 and cost: -0.1153) for the sampled countries. This implies that inbound 
FDI is reliably inversely proportional to the documents (number), time (days) and cost (US$) 
of exporting a container of goods by the domestic SMEs of a country, as postulated in the 
conceptual framework of this study.  
 
In order to corroborate the pair-wise correlation results presented above, a two-tailed Pearson 
product-moment correlation was done basing on the 2009 annual/cross-sectional data for the 
sampled 154 countries. The results of the Pearson product-moment correlation are presented 
in Table 4.24 below. 
 
Table264.24: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients for the variables of 
deregulation of export trading, cross-border M&As and FDI (author’s analysis of cross-
sectional data provided by the World Bank 2010 and UNCTAD 2010 for year 2009) 
 M&As (US$ 
millions) 
Inbound 
FDI (US$ 
millions) 
Documents 
(number) for 
exporting 
Time (days) 
for exporting 
Cost (US$ per 
container) of 
exporting 
M&As (US$ millions) 1     
Inbound FDI (US$ 
millions) 
0.650
**
 
(0.000) 
1    
Documents (number) 
for exporting 
-0.251
**
 
(0.002) 
-0.262
**
 
(0.001) 
1   
Time (days) for 
exporting 
-0.258
**
 
(0.001) 
-0.229
**
 
(0.004) 
0.554
**
 
(0.000) 
1  
Cost (US$ per 
container) of exporting 
-0.111 
(0.171) 
-0.151 
(0.061) 
0.346
**
 
(0.000) 
0.772
**
 
(0.000) 
1 
Number of observations = 154 
Notes: ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; bracketed values = p-values 
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Table 4.24 above shows that, at a 0.1 level of significance, the number of export documents 
and the time (days) for exporting are negatively correlated to both cross-border M&As and 
inbound FDI, while M&As are positively correlated to FDI for the sampled countries. This 
outcome buttresses the conceptual postulation of the study that deregulation (reduction) of the 
documents (number) and the time (days) for exporting leads to increased cross-border M&As 
and consequently higher inbound FDI. 
 
From the correlation results shown in Tables: 4.23 and 4.24 above, it is evident that the time 
(days) for exporting has the greatest negative correlation with inbound FDI (-0.2343 and -
0.258, respectively) among the three components (sub-variables) of deregulation of export 
trading. This is followed by the number of exporting documents (with coefficient = -0.2187 
and -0.251, respectively). The cost for exporting has the least correlation with FDI and this is 
probably because of the statistically insignificant correlation between this variable and cross-
border M&As (with a p-value = 0.171).   
 
In summary, the correlation results show that in general, inbound FDI is negatively correlated 
to the documents, time and cost of exporting a standard container of goods by the domestic 
SMEs of the sampled countries. The pair-wise correlation results substantiate the study‘s 
basic presupposition that there is a statistically significant relationship between inbound FDI 
and the deregulation of export trading by the domestic SMEs of a country.   
 
4.6.3 Regression results 
Inbound FDI is regressed against the sub-variables of deregulation of export trading 
considered for this study basing on the panel data for the sampled countries using an 
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estimated cross-sectional time series FGLS of the Random Effects Model. The regression 
model applied is represented by equation (3
'
) below: 
 
Estimated model of FDI regressed on deregulation of export trading 
 
ititit jjiihhit
ˆˆˆˆˆln 0        (3
'
) 
 
Where: 
 itˆln  Estimated natural log of FDI inflows 
 
h
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the number of documents for  
           export  
 
i
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the time (days) for exporting a 20- 
           feet container of goods   
 j
ˆ  Estimated regression coefficient for the cost (US$ per container) for  
           exporting  
 h Number of official documents used to export a 20-feet container of  
           goods  
 i Time (days) spent on exporting a 20-feet container of goods  
 j Cost (US$) to export a 20-feet container of goods 
  i = The cross-sectional unit identifier (i.e. individual dimension/countries  
         analysed)  
 t = The time period identifier (i.e. the time dimension/years covered) 
 
The cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions executed were based on the percentiles of 
the respective units of measurements for variables considered, as given by the sources of the 
panel data. Percentiles of variables were chosen for this regression because it is advisable to 
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estimate panel data models using identical units of measurements (Greene, 2003). The results 
from the cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions using percentiles of observations are 
presented in Table 4.25 below. 
 
Table274.25: Output of the cross-sectional time series of FGLS regression of FDI 
against the variables for deregulation of export trading using percentiles of observations 
(author’s analysis of panel data provided by the World Bank and UNCTAD) 
LnFDI   Coefficient Standard error Z P > /Z/ 
Documents for exporting  0.0008258 0.0013476 0.61 0.540 
Time (days) for exporting  -0.0109587 0.0015066 -7.27 0.000 
Cost of exporting  -0.0015847 0.0013013 -1.22 0.223 
Constant      4.205811 0.0709982 59.24 0.000 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
Wald chi2(3) = 110.87 
 Log likelihood = -988.8881 
 Estimated autocorrelations = 0 
Number of observations = 770  
Number of groups = 154  
Time periods = 5 
Note: LnFDI= Natural log of FDI  
 
Table 4.25 shows that the overall model for the cross-sectional time series FGLS regression 
based on the percentiles of variables is statistically significant with a p-value (Prob > chi2) = 
0.0000. The table also shows that there is no autocorrelation in deriving the regression 
results, and the panel dataset is balanced (770 observations, 154 groups and 5 time periods). 
The regression results, as presented in Table 4.25, are therefore valid and reliable.  
 
From Table 4.25 it can be noted the that time (days) for exporting is the only explanatory 
component (sub-variable) of deregulation of export trading that is statistically significant at a 
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0.01 level of significance and with a negative coefficient (-0.0109587). This implies that the 
time (days) for exporting is the only statistically reliable component (sub-variable) of 
deregulation of export trading that is inversely proportional to inbound FDI and thus 
statistically significant in explaining the variance in inbound FDI.  
  
From Table 4.25 it is evident that the regression coefficient for the cost of exporting is 
negative (-0.0015847). This implies some inverse proportionality between FDI and the cost 
of exporting, although this association was statistically insignificant and the regression 
coefficient was meagre. The cause for the statistical insignificance of the regression 
coefficient for the cost of exporting is possibly the fact that some countries are landlocked 
while others face various export logistical and structural bottlenecks, which should however 
not deter FDI choices (UNCTAD, 2008). 
 
In précis, the results from the regressions of inbound FDI against the three components (sub-
variables) of deregulation of export trading show that statistically, only the time (days) for 
exporting is significantly and conversely proportional to FDI inflows. Hence, a country is 
likely to realise increased FDI inflows as it deregulates (reduces) the time (days) it takes its 
domestic SMEs to export a standard container of goods. This outcome supports the study‘s 
hypothesis that there is a statistically significant relationship between inbound FDI and the 
time (days) it takes a domestic SME to export a 20-feet container of goods.  
 
4.6.4 Granger causality tests results 
Granger causality tests are executed basing on the panel data for the various income 
(economic) groupings of the sampled 154 countries for the period 2006–2009 to investigate 
Deregulation, FDI, M&As, and SMEs Page 103 
 
the causal relationships between FDI and the variables of deregulation of export trading. The 
null hypotheses upon which the Granger causality tests are based are: 
 H0i: Number (forms) of official documents for exporting a standard container of  
         goods by domestic SMEs does not Granger-cause inbound FDI 
 H0ii: Time (days) it takes to export a standard container of goods by domestic SMEs  
          does not Granger-cause inbound FDI 
 H0iii: Cost (US$) of exporting a standard container of goods by domestic SMEs does  
          not Granger-cause inbound FDI 
The null hypotheses stated above are equivalent to interpreting asymptotic F-test of joint 
significance. In all cases, the null hypothesis can be accepted only where the asymptotic p-
value (Prob > chi2) is greater than 0.05 (asymptotic p > 0.05) and rejected where the p-value 
(Prob>chi2) is less than 0.05 (asymptotic p < 0.05). 
 
The results of the Granger causality tests based on the null hypotheses H0i, H0ii, and H0iii 
stated above for the sampled LICs, MICs, and HICs are as detailed in Tables: 4.26, 4.27 and 
4.28 and as summarised in Table 4.29 below. 
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Table284.26: Granger causality test results for the number (forms) of documents for 
exporting and inbound FDI for the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel 
data from the World Bank and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs  0.19 0.7414 0.74 0.3896 
MICs  231.78 0.0418 927.13 0.0000** 
HICs  0.63 0.5727 2.52 0.1122 
Number of observations = 4  
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Note: ** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality  
 
 
Table 4.26 shows that the number (forms) of documents to be completed by domestic SMEs 
while exporting a standard container of goods Granger-cause inbounds FDI in only the 
sampled middle income countries.  
Table294.27: Granger causality test results for the time (days) for exporting and 
inbound FDI for the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the 
World Bank and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs  0.61 0.5775 2.45 0.1179 
MICs  1.70 0.4161 6.82 0.0090** 
HICs  0.26 0.6981 1.05 0.3047 
Number of observations = 4 
 Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Note: ** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality 
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Table 4.27 shows that time (days) spent by domestic SMEs on exporting a standard container 
of goods Granger-causes inbound FDI in only the sampled group of middle income countries.  
Table304.28: Granger causality test results for the cost of exporting and inbound FDI 
for the LICs, MICs and HICs (author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank 
and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Country grouping F (1, 1) Prob > F Chi2(1) Prob > 
chi2 
LICs  0.10 0.8029 0.41 0.5222 
MICs  4556.25 0.0094 18224.99 0.0000** 
HICs  20.64 0.1379 82.57 0.0000** 
Number of observations = 4  
Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Note: ** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality 
 
 
Table 4.28 shows that the cost (US$) of exporting a standard (20-feet) container of goods by 
domestic SMEs Granger-causes inbound FDI in only the sampled MICs.  
Table314.29: Summary of results (p-values) from the Granger causality test for the 
deregulation of export trading and FDI for the sampled LICs, MICs and HICs 
(author’s analysis of panel data from the World Bank and UNCTAD 2006–2009) 
Variable Sub-variable LICs MICs HICs 
Deregulation of 
export trading: 
Documents (number): 0.3896 0.0000** 0.1122 
Time (days): 0.1179 0.0090** 0.3047 
Cost (US$ per container): 0.5222 0.0000** 0.0000** 
Number of observations = 4 
 Sample: 2006 to 2009 
Note: ** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-causality;  
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Tables: 4.26 and 4.29 show that the numbers of documents for exporting Granger-causes 
inbound FDI in only the sampled MICs. Hence, the null hypothesis H0i (number (forms) of 
official documents for exporting a standard container of goods by domestic SMEs does not 
Granger-cause inbound FDI) is rejected for only the sampled MICs, but accepted for the 
sampled low and high income countries.  
 
Tables: 4.27 and 4.29 show that the time (days) spent exporting a 20-feet container by 
domestic SMEs Granger-causes inbound FDI in only the sampled MICs. Thus, the null 
hypothesis H0ii (time (days) it takes to export a standard container of goods by domestic 
SMEs does not Granger-cause inbound FDI) is rejected for only the case of the sampled 
middle income countries but accepted for the sampled low and high income countries.  
 
Tables: 4.28 and 4.29 show that the cost (US$) of exporting a standard (20-feet) container of 
goods by domestic SMEs Granger-causes inbound FDI in the sampled groups of the middle 
and high income countries but not in that of the low income countries. Thus, the null 
analogous hypothesis (H0iii: cost (US$) of exporting a standard container of goods by 
domestic SMEs does not Granger-cause inbound FDI) is accepted for only the sampled low 
income countries but rejected for the sampled middle and high income countries.  
 
The null hypotheses of non-causality (H0i H0ii and H0iii) are not rejected for the sampled 
group of the low income countries probably because such countries have exceptional 
characteristics that cause them to fail to attract FDI inflows through conventional measures 
that prove effective in the MICs and HICs (UNCTAD, 2008). 
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In précis, the results from the Granger causality tests show that all the components (sub-
variables) of deregulation of export trading Granger-cause inbound FDI in the sampled 
middle income countries. For the sampled group of high income countries, the only 
component (sub-variable) of deregulation export trading that Granger-causes inbound FDI is 
the cost (US$) of exporting a standard (20-feet) container of goods.  
 
4.6.5 Empirical corroboration of results 
This sub-section contains results from a comparative analysis of deregulation of export 
trading, cross-border M&As and inbound FDI based on empirical data from the World Bank 
(2010) and UNCTAD (2010) to corroborate the results presented in sub-sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2, 
4.5.3 and 4.5.4.  
 
Empirical data from the Ease of Doing Business database (2010) and the World Investment 
Report of 2010 show that countries that have high levels of deregulation of export trading do 
realise more cross-border M&As and inbound FDI than their counterparts. This empirical 
observation is illustrated in by Tables: 4.30, 4.31 and 4.32 below. 
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Table324.30: Cross-border M&As and FDI realised by countries with the highest and 
lowest deregulation of cross-border (export/import) trading in 2009 (empirical data 
from the World Bank 2010 and UNCTAD 2010) 
Countries with the highest deregulation of 
cross-border (export/import) trading 
 
Countries with the lowest deregulation of 
cross-border (export/import) trading 
Country Global 
rank 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
 
Country Global 
rank 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
Singapore 1 9 693 16 809  Uzbekistan 174 4 750 
Hong Kong 2 3 028 48 449  Burundi 175 - 10 
Estonia 3 28 1 680  Burkina Faso 176 - 171 
Finland 4 508 2 551  Azerbaijan 177 - 473 
United Arab 
Emirates 
5 300 4 003  Congo, Rep.  178 - 2 083 
Denmark 6 1 651 7 800  Tajikistan 179 - 8 
Sweden 7 1 098 10 851  Iraq 180 - 1 070 
Korea, Rep 8 1 956 5 844  Central 
African Rep. 
181 - 42 
Norway 9 1 630 6 657  Kazakhstan 182 1 322 12 649 
Panama 10 20 1 773  Afghanistan 183 - 185 
Average 1 991.2 10 641.7 
 
Average 132.6 1 744.1 
Note: - denotes unknown figure, which has been equated to zero in this study 
 
Table 4.30 shows that, in 2009, the average value of M&As (US$1 991.2 million) attained by 
the 10 countries with the highest deregulation of cross-border (export and import) trade was 
much higher than that attained by the 10 countries with the lowest levels of the same form of 
deregulation (US$132.6 million). Likewise, the 10 countries with the highest levels of 
deregulation realised an average of inbound FDI (US$10 641.7 million) that was much more 
than that attained by the 10 countries with the lowest levels of deregulation (US$1 744.1). 
This empirical observation buttresses the study‘s conceptual premise that deregulation of 
export trading by domestic SMEs is likely to enhance FDI inflows, especially through cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. 
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The analysis and observations made above were bolstered by further comparative analysis of 
the empirical data pertaining to the documents, time and cost of exporting and how they 
relate to cross-border M&As and FDI inflows, as shown in Tables 4.31, 4.32 and 4.33 below. 
 
Table334.31: Cross-border M&As and FDI attained by countries with the fewest and 
most number of documents for export trading in 2009 (empirical data from the World 
Bank 2010 and UNCTAD 2010) 
Countries with the fewest export documents 
 
Countries with the most export documents 
Country Doc. 
No. 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
 Country Doc. 
No. 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
France 2 724 59 628  Cambodia 11 - 533 
Estonia 3 28 1 680  Namibia 11 59 516 
Korea, Rep. 3 1 956 5 844  Mauritania 11 - -38 
Panama 3 20 1 773  Angola 11 -471 13 101 
Canada 3 11 389 18 657  Malawi 11 0 60 
Micronesia 3 0 8  Burkina Faso 11 - 171 
Singapore 4 9 693 16 809  Congo, Rep. 11 0 2 083 
Hong Kong 4 3 028 48 449  Kazakhstan 11 1 322 12 649 
Finland 4 508 2 551  Afghanistan 12 - 185 
United Arab 
Emirates 
4 300 4 003  Fiji 13 - 238 
Average/Mean 3 2 764.6 15 940.2  Average/Mean 11 91.0 2 949.8 
Notes: Doc. no. = the number of official documents for export trading domestic SMEs had to deal 
with; - denotes unknown figure, which has been equated to zero in this study 
 
 
Table 4.31 shows that, in 2009, the ten countries with the fewest export documents (i.e. with 
an average of three export documents) registered an average value of M&As (US$2 764.6 
million) that is much higher than that attained by the ten countries with the most export 
documents (i.e. with an average of eleven export documents) (US$91 million). Similarly, it is 
evident from Table 4.31 that countries with the fewest export documents attracted a much 
higher average of FDI inflows (US$15 940.2 million) than that attracted by the ten countries 
with the most/highest number of export documents (US$2 949.8 million). Inference from this 
empirical observation fortifies the hypothetical foundation of the study that deregulation 
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(reduction) of the export documents apparently boosts FDI inflows, markedly through cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Table344.32: Cross-border M&As and FDI achieved by countries with the fastest and 
slowest time (days) for exporting goods in 2009 (empirical data from the World Bank 
2010 and UNCTAD 2010) 
Countries with the fastest/shortest time 
(fewest days) for exporting 
 
Countries with the slowest/longest time 
(days) for exporting 
Country Days 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
 
Country Days 
 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI (US$ 
millions) 
Singapore 5 9 693 16 809 Central 
African 
Rep. 
54 - 42 
Estonia 5 28 1 680  Niger 59 - 739 
Denmark 5 1 651 7 800  Kyrgyz 
Rep. 
63 - 60 
Hong Kong 6 3 028 48 449  Angola 65 -471 13 101 
Netherlands 6 17 988 26 949  Uzbekistan 71 4 750 
United States 6 40 085 129 883  Afghanistan 74 - 185 
Luxembourg 6 444 27 273  Chad 75 - 462 
Norway 7 1 630 6 657  Tajikistan 82 - 8 
Germany 7 12 790 35 606  Kazakhstan 89 1 322 12 649 
Cyprus 7 52 5 797  Iraq 102 - 1 070 
Average 6 8 738.9 30 690.3  Average 73 85.5 2 906.6 
Note: - denotes unknown figure, which has been equated to zero in this study 
 
 
Looking at Table 4.32, it is evident that in 2009, the ten countries with the fastest/shortest 
time (fewest days) for exporting (i.e. with an average of six days) registered an average value 
of M&As (US$8 738.9 million) that is much higher than that attained by the ten countries 
with the slowest/longest time (i.e. with an average of 73 export documents) (US$85.5 
million). Likewise, Table 4.32 also shows that the ten countries with the fastest/shortest 
export time attained a much greater average of FDI inflows (US$30 690.3 million) than that 
attained by the ten countries with the slowest/longest time (most days) for exporting 
(US$2 906.6 million). This empirical inference sustains the study‘s hypothetical observation 
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that deregulation (reduction) of the time (days) for exporting a standard (20-feet) container of 
goods by domestic SMEs ostensibly increases inbound FDI, noticeably through cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. Hence, the heavily regulated LICs, the majority of which have the 
slowest/longest time (most days) for exporting, are likely to realise greater FDI inflows 
manifestly through increased cross-border M&As as they deregulate (reduce) the time their 
respective domestic SMEs take to export a standard container of goods. 
 
Table354.33: Cross-border M&As and FDI attained by countries with the least and 
most cost (US$) of export trading in 2009 (empirical data from the World Bank 2010 
and UNCTAD 2010) 
Countries with the least/lowest cost (US$ per 
container) of exporting 
 
Countries with the most/highest cost (US$ 
per container) of exporting 
 
 
Country 
 
Cost (US$ per 
container) 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
 
 
 
Country 
Cost (US$ 
per 
container) 
M&A 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
(US$ 
millions) 
Malaysia 450 354 1 381 Uzbekistan 3 100 4 750 
Singapore 456 9 693 16 809  Tajikistan 3 150 - 8 
China 500 10 898 95 000  Uganda 3 190 - 799 
Finland 540 508 2 551  Rwanda 3 275 - 119 
United Arab 
Emirates 
593 300 4 003  Zimbabwe 3 280 6 60 
Latvia 600 109 72  Afghanistan 3 350 - 185 
Pakistan 611 - 2 387  Niger 3 545 - 739 
Hong Kong 625 3 028 48 449  Iraq 3 900 - 1 070 
Thailand 625 346 5 949  Central African 
Rep.  
5 491 - 42 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
630 - 311  Chad 5 497 - 462 
Average/Mean 563 2 523.6 17 691.2  Average/Mean 3 778 1.0 423.4 
Note: - denotes unknown figure, which has been equated to zero in this study 
 
 
Table 4.33 shows that, in 2009, the ten countries with the least/lowest cost for exporting (i.e. 
with an average of US$563) registered an average value of M&A (US$2 523.6 million) that 
is much more than that attained by the ten countries with the most/highest cost (i.e. with an 
average of US$3 778) (US$1 million). Similarly, from Table 4.33 it is apparent that the ten 
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countries with the lowest cost of exporting attracted a much higher average of inbound FDI 
(US$17 691.2 million) than that attracted by the 10 countries with the highest cost of 
exporting (US$423.4 million). This empirical proof upholds the conceptual presupposition of 
the study that deregulation (reduction) of the cost (US$) of exporting a standard (20-feet) 
container of goods by domestic SMEs apparently intensifies FDI inflows, perceptibly through 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the heavily regulated countries, most of which 
have a high cost of exporting (World Bank, 2010), are likely to attract more inbound FDI, 
especially through increased cross-border M&As, as they deregulate (reduce) the cost their 
respective domestic SMEs incur to export a standard container of goods. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter contains the conclusions of the study based on the summaries of results 
presented and discussed in Chapter Four and the recommendations deduced from the study. 
The chapter is thus structured into the following sections: 5.2 presents the conclusions based 
on the summaries of the results from the study. The section is split into four sub-sections 
arranged in respect to the specific objectives and key explanatory and intervening variables of 
the study. Section 5.3 covers the recommendations regarding the relationship between the 
investigated explanatory and criterion variables; 5.4 presents the limitations of the study; and 
5.5 covers recommendations for further research studies to bridge some of the identified 
research gaps.   
 
5.2  Summary of conclusions of the study 
This section presents the conclusions of the study‘s findings according to the conceptual 
framework, hypotheses and the specific objectives that guided the study. The section has four 
subsections, as presented below.  
 
5.2.1 Conclusions on deregulation, M&As and FDI correlations 
Pearson product-moment correlations of  the aggregate variables of business deregulation, 
cross-border M&As and inbound FDI using reveal statistically significant and negative 
correlations between: business regulation and cross-border M&As; and between business 
regulation and inbound FDI, while the correlation between cross-border M&As and inbound 
FDI is positive and also statistically significant. Hence, each pair of variables reliably proves 
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to be inversely proportional, save for the correlation between cross-border M&As and 
inbound FDI. Thus, as a country deregulates the business environment for its domestic SMEs, 
it is likely to realise increased cross-border M&As and consequently realize more FDI 
inflows. However, these results are derived from correlations that do not necessarily indicate 
causal relationships thus this necessitates more investigations to be conducted using various 
other statistical methodologies and focusing on a few specific explanatory variables so as 
emerge with thorough and reliable results. Sub-sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 present 
more specific conclusions of the study that corroborate and substantiate the inferences stated 
in this sub-section.      
 
5.2.2 Conclusions on deregulation of starting a business and FDI  
Data analysed generally show statistically significant relationships between inbound FDI and 
the deregulation of starting a business as summarised and concluded below. 
 
Descriptive statistics indicate that HICs have the lowest while the LICs have average and 
absolute procedures, time, cost and minimum capital for starting businesses. Descriptive 
statistics also show that, on average, the HICs register the highest levels of M&As and 
inbound FDI, while the LICs attract the least.  Hence, these findings uphold the conceptual 
presupposition that there is a statistically significant relationship between inbound FDI and 
the deregulation of starting a business by the domestic SMEs. 
 
Pair-wise correlation coefficients for the relationship between FDI and the variables (i.e. 
procedures, time and cost) of starting a business generally indicate that  a country is bound to 
realize increased FDI inflows as it deregulates (reduces) the procedures, time and cost of 
starting SME businesses.  
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Regression of FDI against the time and cost for starting businesses results into statistically 
significant relationships. Hence, a country is likely to realise greater FDI inflows as it 
deregulates the time and cost for starting domestic SMEs. 
 
Granger causality tests show that reduction (deregulation) of procedures, time, cost and 
minimum capital for starting domestic SMEs causes increased inbound FDI in the middle 
income countries. For the high income countries, however, Granger causality tests reveal that 
only the deregulation of procedures, time and minimum capital for starting domestic SMEs 
cause FDI inflows. Hence, deregulation of starting domestic SMEs generally proves to cause 
increased FDI inflows in at least the high and middle income countries.   
 
In conclusion, findings generally proves that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between inbound FDI and deregulation of starting domestic SMEs and this considerably 
corroborates one the basic premises of the study. Thus, by and large a country is bound to 
realise greater FDI inflows, especially through cross-border M&As, as it deregulates the 
procedures, time, cost and minimum capital for starting businesses by its domestic SMEs.   
 
5.2.3 Conclusions on deregulation of paying taxes and FDI  
 Analysis of the relationship between FDI inflows and deregulation leads to the following 
summarize d results and conclusions.  
 
Descriptive statistics indicate that the HICs, with the lowest average number of taxes, time 
spent paying taxes and the total tax rate imposed on their domestic SMEs, register the highest 
mean cross border M&As as well as FDI inflows. In a similar order, the HICs are closely 
followed by the MICs while the LICs emerge with the most wanting averages. Hence, results 
from the descriptive statistics considerably sustain the conceptual inference of the study that 
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there is a statistically significant positive relationship between inbound FDI and the 
deregulation of paying taxes by the domestic SMEs of a country. 
 
Pair-wise correlation coefficient for the relationship between FDI and the number of taxes 
paid per year is negative and statistically significant.  This implies that a country is likely to 
attain increased FDI inflows as it deregulates the number of taxes imposed on domestic 
SMEs.  
 
Regressions of FDI against the total tax rate and the number of taxes paid per year result into 
negative and statistically significant coefficients. Hence, statistically, the number of taxes and 
the total tax rate paid by a country‘s domestic SMEs are reliably inversely proportional to the 
FDI inflows attained. Such results considerably concur with the conceptual premises of the 
study in respect to the relationship between FDI and regulation of taxes paid by businesses 
any given country.  
 
Granger causality tests prove that reducing the time spent paying taxes by domestic SMEs 
increases FDI inflows in all the low, middle and high income countries. These causality tests 
also reveal that deregulating the number of taxes and the total tax increases rate inbound FDI 
in the middle and high income countries.  
 
A simple comparative analysis of the empirical datasets compiled by the World Bank (2010) 
and UNCTAD (2010) indicates that countries that rank high in the deregulation of paying 
taxes register higher averages of cross-border M&As and inbound FDI than their 
counterparts.  
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In conclusion, the analysis done generally shows that there is a statistically significant and 
inverse relationship between inbound FDI and deregulation of paying taxes by the domestic 
SMEs of any country. Hence, a country is expected to realise more FDI inflows, especially 
through increased cross-border M&As, as it deregulates the number of taxes, the time spent 
paying taxes and the total tax rate formally imposed on its domestic SMEs.  This finding 
significantly substantiates the conceptual premises of the study in respect to the relationship 
between FDI and the deregulation of paying taxes. 
  
 
5.2.4 Conclusions on deregulation of export trading and FDI  
Findings and conclusions regarding the relationship between FDI and the deregulation of 
export trading are as summarized below.  
 
Descriptive statistics indicate that - the lowest and highest averages of: documents, time and 
cost of exporting a standard container of goods are in the HICs and LICs respectively.  The 
same statistics also show that the highest and lowest averages of cross-border M&As and 
inbound FDI are in the HICs and LICs respectively. These findings thus, considerably affirm 
the conceptual inference of the study that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between inbound FDI and deregulation of export trading by the domestic SMEs of any given 
country. 
 
Pair-wise correlations show that FDI is significantly and negatively correlated to the number 
of documents, time and cost of exporting a standard container of goods. Thus, FDI is reliably 
bound to increase as a country reduces the number of documents, time and cost of exporting a 
standard container of goods by her domestic SMEs. These correlation results corroborate the 
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basic hypothesis of the study that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
inbound FDI and the deregulation of export trading.  
 
Regression results show that the time and cost of exporting a container of goods are 
statistically significant and inversely proportional to FDI inflows. These results, too, 
considerably substantiate the conceptual inferences of the study that there are statistically 
significant relationships between inbound FDI and the deregulation of export trading by the 
domestic SMEs of a country.  
 
Granger causality tests show that deregulation /reduction of the documents, time and the cost 
of exporting increases inbound FDI in the sampled middle income countries. The tests also 
indicate that reducing costs of exporting increases FDI inflows in the HICs. Hence, the results 
there is a statistically significant causal relationship between inbound FDI and the 
deregulation of export trading by the domestic SMEs. 
 
Comparative analysis of empirical datasets by the World Bank (2010) and UNCTAD (2010) 
show that countries that rank high in the deregulation of export trading do register high 
averages of cross-border M&As and consequently attain greater inbound FDI than their 
counterparts.  
 
In conclusion, findings show that generally, there is a statistically significant and inverse 
relationship between inbound FDI and deregulation of export trading by the domestic SMEs. 
Thus, a country is likely to attract more inbound FDI, notably through increased cross-border 
M&As, as it reduces the documents, time and cost of export trade.  
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These revelations uphold the basic hypotheses of the study in respect to the relationship 
between FDI and the deregulation of export trading.  
 
 
5.3  Recommendations  
This section contains recommendations based on the results and conclusions of the study 
stated above. The recommendations made are in respect to each of the explanatory variables 
analysed in the study. Hence, this section is structured into the following sub-sections: 5.3.1 
presents the recommendations regarding the deregulation of starting a business by domestic 
SMEs; 5.3.2 covers recommendations pertaining to the deregulation of paying taxes by a 
country‘s domestic SMEs; and 5.3.3 presents recommendations regarding the deregulation of 
export trading by a country‘s domestic SMEs.     
 
5.3.1 Recommendations for deregulation of starting a business 
Based on the results and conclusions of the study presented above, it is recommendable for 
all countries, especially the heavily regulated LICs, to effectively deregulate the starting of 
businesses by both foreign and domestic entrepreneurs in order to realise more cross-border 
M&As and FDI inflows. The recommendable deregulation involves a country‘s competitive 
but considered reduction of the number of procedures, time (days), cost (percentage of 
income per capita) and the minimum paid-up capital (percentage of income per capita) for 
starting a business by especially its domestic SMEs. Specific measures recommendable for 
deregulating the starting of businesses are explained below.  
 
Full-fledged one-stop shops (or offices/desks/points/spots) for registering business entities 
should be established to provide all the necessary information and guidance and to handle all 
the documentation for starting a business. The one-stop shops/spots should merge and reduce 
the business start-up procedures into as few as one procedure, just as in Senegal in 2008. This 
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is likely to reduce the number of documents, prospects of corruption and time spent moving 
from one office to another to have the necessary information and/or documents certified by 
those intending to start/register domestic SMEs in most countries, and particularly those that 
are heavily regulated.  
 
The decentralisation of company registration offices (authorities) ought to be observed so as 
to enable whoever wishes to start a business to easily access the concerned authorities from 
any part of the country. Currently, many countries, especially the heavily regulated LICs such 
as Uganda, as well as many MICs, have centralised company registration systems/offices that 
are usually located in only their capital cities, which makes it cumbersome for SMEs located 
upcountry or in remote locations to formally register and start their respective businesses.   
 
Courts of law and costly legal services should be eliminated from the processes of starting 
any business. The use of lawyers to provide legal assistance in starting businesses should be 
made optional. This recommendation is likely to drastically reduce the cost, procedures and 
time for starting domestic businesses, especially where legal services and court proceedings 
are generally tedious, costly, laborious and lengthy, such as in the heavily regulated LICs.  
 
Electronic (i.e., online/digital) registration of businesses in a countrywide database should be 
established to ease and expedite the process of registering and starting new businesses. It is 
advisable for all countries, especially the heavily regulated LICs and MICs, to establish 
paperless registration and filing systems that will not only expedite the starting of businesses 
but also reduce annual administrative costs. Both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs should 
be enabled to benefit from computerised business registration systems. It is recommendable 
for all countries to strive to enable entrepreneurs to start businesses with as few as a single 
online procedure, because such electronic registration can expedite company formation. 
However, it should be noted that electronic registration is more complicated than it appears. 
Deregulation, FDI, M&As, and SMEs Page 121 
 
For example, in Sweden, applications for company, tax and labour registrations can be 
completed online, but most forms must still be printed and signed by hand. Hence, electronic 
registration should be assumed cautiously, although it has recommendable advantages in 
deregulating the starting of businesses. 
 
The costs of starting a business ought to be eliminated or at least reduced to only a fixed 
registration fee regardless of company size or other form of business entity being established 
by domestic as well as foreign investors.   
 
The obligation to publish a notice in a journal, gazette or any other publication before starting 
a business should be repealed wherever it is being practiced or avoided in all countries 
pursuing deregulation as a strategy to enhance FDI inflows.  
 
Standardised business registration forms ought to be developed and equally utilised by both 
domestic and foreign investors who are seeking to start businesses in all the countries that 
intend to resort to business deregulation as a means of realising greater FDI inflows.  
 
The minimum paid-up capital requirement for starting a business ought to be kept nominal or 
zero. It is advisable for countries to strive to abolish the minimum capital requirement for 
starting a business and to allow domestic and foreign investors to determine what is 
appropriate for the business based on its type and capital structure. 
 
The recommended measures stated above should equally apply and benefit both domestic and 
foreign investors striving to start businesses (i.e. without any discrimination or bias) in all the 
countries that choose business deregulation as a strategy for attracting inbound FDI. The 
measures recommended above can serve as a potent strategy for enhancing FDI inflows, 
notably through cross-border M&As, while mitigating negative socio-economic experiences 
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such as corruption, extensive informal business sectors and bureaucratic red-tape, which are 
often a result of heavy business regulations.   
 
5.3.2 Recommendations for deregulation of paying taxes 
The empirical findings of the study necessitate the recommendation of competitive 
deregulation of the payment of taxes by both foreign and domestic investors as a viable 
strategy for boosting FDI inflows. Such recommendable deregulation specifically emphasises 
relentless competition in deregulating the number (forms) of taxes payable per year, the time 
(hours) spent paying taxes and the total tax rates imposed on all investors (domestic or 
foreign).   
 
The recommendable ways of deregulating the payment of taxes include consolidating the 
number of taxes, cutting back special exemptions and privileges, simplifying filing 
requirements and broadening the tax base by keeping rates moderate in especially the heavily 
regulated LICs and MICs. The rationale and practical approaches for realising these 
deregulatory recommendations are explained below. 
 
It is advisable to simplify tax filing requirements by going electronic. Introducing electronic 
filing makes paying taxes easier. For instance, businesses can enter financial information 
online and file it with one click – and with no calculations. Errors can be identified instantly 
and returns can be processed quickly. It is also advisable to enable businesses to file an 
electronic corporate tax return and pay corporate income tax annually. Complying with tax 
requirements should take as few hours as possible per year.  
 
It is also advisable to cut/lower tax rates imposed on all domestic and foreign investors as yet 
another measure of deregulating the paying of taxes. By lowering tax rates, countries can 
increase tax revenue through persuading more businesses to comply with the more favourable 
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rules. Hence, cutting tax rates leads to greater compliance, which leads to greater revenue 
collected that can be used to improve the investment climate, which in turn attracts more 
foreign investors and consequently leads to greater FDI inflows. Therefore, it is strongly 
recommendable to broaden the tax base by keeping rates low in all countries seeking to 
attract substantial FDI inflows through business deregulation. However, it is important to 
note that tax reforms inspire political debate and can be hotly contested, although both 
businesses and governments benefit when taxes are simple, fair and can set incentives for 
growth.  
 
5.3.3 Recommendations for deregulation of export trading  
Basing on the findings and conclusions of the study, it is recommendable for all heavily 
regulated countries to competitively deregulate export trading by reducing the number of 
documents, time (days) and costs of exporting goods. In order for countries to effectively 
implement such recommendable deregulations, it is advisable that they make document filing 
electronic, use risk-assessment policies for inspections of exports and go regional with 
reforms of customs and transport rules. The justification and details of these recommendable 
measures are explained below. 
 
It is advisable to use risk-assessment policies for inspections of exports as a way of 
deregulating export trading, because it reduces the unnecessary delays and inconveniences 
that are often encountered by enterprises in the absence of such policies. The recommended 
risk-assessment policies work as follows: When a customs officer receives the cargo 
documents, he/she runs them through the computer. A software program calculates the 
probability that the shipment should be inspected. The probability is based on the profiles of 
the business and the freight forwarders and on the nature of the goods and their destination. 
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In some countries, the containers may be scanned for weight and the shapes of objects inside. 
If nothing suspicious arises, the container gets a green light and sails through customs. Above 
a certain risk threshold, a yellow light comes on and the documentation is thoroughly 
checked while the container remains sealed. At a still-higher threshold, a red light blinks and 
the container is opened for inspection. In brief, the policy allows for opening and inspecting 
only a small percentage of containers rather than each and every container being exported. 
The benefits accruing from the recommended risk-assessment policies/system are several. 
For example, the system allows for the limiting of inspections to only a reasonably small 
percentage of shipments and it also increases the detection of smuggled goods. Furthermore, 
risk analysis can reduce delays and makes exporting less cumbersome. However, it is vital to 
note that the recommended risk analysis is only as useful as the data on which it is based. 
Even the most sophisticated risk-analysis software may not help if there is no information 
from which to develop the necessary profiles of traders, freight forwarders and the like. 
Reforms to introduce risk assessment require patience and diligence.  
 
Another recommendable measure for deregulating export trading is to go regional with 
reforms of customs and transport. This is because several countries are landlocked and have 
limited regional trade cooperation. Being landlocked with limited or no regional economic 
cooperation with non-landlocked neighbouring countries can prove debilitating to export 
trading. It is therefore advisable for countries, especially the heavily regulated LICs such as 
Uganda, to share customs forms so as to ensure that export trade paperwork and costs are 
considerably reduced. The recommendable steps for neighbouring countries are to remove 
border checks altogether and introduce harmonised transport rules.  
 
Electronic data-interchange systems ought to be established to expedite export trade 
clearance as yet another recommendable measure for effecting deregulation of export trading. 
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This is because electronic transmission of documents not only speeds the clearance of goods, 
but also often reduces the possibilities for paying bribes. However, to avoid a dual electronic 
and manual customs clearance process, the new systems must be complemented by 
supporting legislation authorising electronic transactions. Using electronic data-interchange 
systems also helps to increase predictability in clearance times and makes it easier to apply 
risk management to customs clearance. Countries observing this recommendation can 
introduce risk-based inspections alongside electronic transmission of documents, which 
enable expedited inspection of containers being exported.  
 
Looking beyond customs is also another advisable approach to implementing the 
recommended deregulation of export trading. This is because while customs reforms remain 
very important to trading across borders (i.e. exporting/importing), several other measures 
(deregulations) also play a part. For instance, customs clearance reduces the time during 
which the export contract is concluded and the time it takes for the goods to leave the port. It 
is important to note that approvals from authorities such as ministries, health authorities, 
security agencies, inspection agencies, port authorities, banks and immigration authorities 
account for most export delays. Countries therefore ought to increasingly recognise the 
importance of a comprehensive approach to export trade facilitation. For example, several 
government agencies as well as private export participants/agencies may be merged through a 
single window system.  
 
More publicity, training and regular meetings with exporters on how to expedite the clearance 
processes are also recommendable for ensuring viable deregulation of export trading. For 
instance, customs brokers with low error rates are rewarded with access to fast-track 
clearance procedures, while those with high error rates face more scrutiny. The payment of 
customs duties need not delay the release of cargo. Instead, export authorities can always 
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introduce a bond or financial guarantee, allowing goods to be released pending completion of 
the paperwork.  
 
The synchronisation of export documents and procedures is another recommendable measure 
for deregulating export trading, which eventually leads to increased inward FDI. This is 
because countries save costs by synchronising such documents and procedures at the border.  
 
The removal of bureaucratic bottlenecks is yet another advisable strategy for implementing 
the recommendable deregulation of export trading to enhance FDI inflows. This is because in 
most heavily regulated countries, export trade is hindered by bureaucratic hurdles at borders. 
For example, in Africa and Central Asia, border crossings account for significant delays in 
export trade. However, this can be overcome through a one-stop border post to serve several 
countries in a particular region. Regional approaches to trade facilitation may yield benefits 
for export traders.  
 
In order for the recommendations stated above to cause substantial FDI inflows to the 
countries that may implement them, it is vital to ensure that they are established to facilitate 
and benefit both the domestic SMEs and the foreign direct investors equally. 
 
5.4  Limitations of the study 
A major limitation of the study is the limited availability of time series (longitudinal) data for 
many of the explanatory variables that restricted the time (longitudinal or ―t‖) dimension of 
the panel data analysed to only five years. The World Bank‘s Ease of Doing Business 
database that served as a source for the explanatory variables used for panel data analysis 
provides the required/relevant and usable data for only five calendar years (2005–2009). This 
limitation compromised the results of the empirical models based on the panel data that could 
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possibly be generated. Richer time series data that covers a span of 10 or more years would 
have produced better estimations and results, but such data could not be accessed.  
 
The major sources of the panel data for the study (i.e. the Ease of Doing Business database 
and the World Investment reports) were compiled with some methodological limitations and 
weaknesses, as explained in Chapter Three, which may have compromised the results of this 
study. For instance, the Doing Business project does not measure all aspects of the business 
environment that matter to firms or investors, or all factors that affect competitiveness. It 
does not, for example, measure security, macroeconomic stability and corruption. The 
methodology applied in compiling the Doing Business reports and Ease of Doing Business 
database has limitations that were considered when interpreting the data. First, the collected 
data refer to businesses in the economy‘s largest business cities and may not be representative 
of regulation in other parts of the economy. Second, the methodology assumes that the 
business has full information on what is required and does not waste time when completing 
procedures, which is not always the case in the real world (World Bank, 2010). 
 
The above stated limitations were, however, addressed by applying a triangulation of research 
methodologies and techniques for this study.  
 
5.5  Recommendations for further research 
In order to complement and/or augment this study, it is recommendable to investigate the 
relationship between inbound FDI and the other variables and sub-variables of business 
deregulation, such as procedures, time and costs of dealing with licences, registering 
property, closing a business, protecting investors and employing workers, among other 
factors, as identified by the World Bank (2010).  
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It is also advisable to further investigate the factors that influence cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions as a strategy for enhancing FDI inflows. 
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Appendices 
 
Lists of the Low, Middle and High Income Countries Sampled for the Study  
 
Low Income countries sampled for the Study  
1. Afghanistan 
2. Bangladesh 
3. Benin 
4. Burkina Faso 
5. Burundi 
6. Cambodia 
7. Central African Republic      
8. Chad 
9. Congo, Dem. Rep. 
10. Eritrea 
11. Ethiopia  
12. Ghana  
 
13. Guinea 
14. Haiti 
15. India 
16. Kenya 
17. Kyrgyz Republic 
18. Lao PDR 
19. Madagascar 
20. Malawi 
21. Mali 
22. Mauritania 
23. Mozambique 
24. Nepal  
 
25. Niger 
26. Rwanda 
27. Senegal 
28. Sierra Leone 
29. Solomon Islands 
30. Tanzania 
31. Togo 
32. Uganda 
33. Zambia 
34. Zimbabwe 
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Middle Income Countries sampled for the Study 
1. Albania 
2. Algeria 
3. Angola 
4. Argentina 
5. Armenia 
6. Azerbaijan 
7. Belarus 
8. Bhutan 
9. Bolivia 
10. Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
11. Botswana 
12. Brazil 
13. Bulgaria 
14. Cameroon 
15. Chile 
16. China 
17. Colombia  
18. Congo, Rep. 
19. Costa Rica 
20. Cote d‘voire 
21. Croatia 
22. Dominican 
Republic 
23. Ecuador 
24. Egypt 
25. El Salvador 
26. Fiji 
27. Georgia 
28. Guatemala 
29. Guyana 
30. Honduras 
31. Indonesia 
32. Iran 
33. Iraq 
34. Jamaica  
35. Jordan 
36. Kazakhstan 
37. Kiribati 
38. Latvia 
39. Lebanon 
40. Lesotho 
41. Lithuania 
42. Macedonia 
43. Malaysia 
44. Maldives 
45. Marshall 
Islands 
46. Mauritius 
47. Mexico 
48. Micronesia 
49. Moldova 
50. Mongolia 
51. Morocco  
52. Namibia 
53. Nicaragua 
54. Nigeria 
55. Oman 
56. Pakistan 
57. Palau 
58. Palestine 
59. Panama 
60. Papua New 
Guine 
61. Paraguay 
62. Peru 
63. Philippines 
64. Romania 
65. Russia 
66. Samoa 
67. Sao Tome & 
Principe 
68. Serbia 
69. Slovakia 
70. South Africa 
71. Sri Lanka 
72. Sudan 
73. Syria 
74. Thailand 
75. Timor-Leste 
76. Tonga 
77. Tunisia 
78. Turkey 
79. Ukraine 
80. Uruguay 
81. Uzbekistan 
82. Vanuatu 
83. Venezuela 
84. Vietnam 
85. Yemen 
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High Income Countries sampled for the Study 
1.   Australia  
2.  Austria  
3.   Belgium  
4.   Canada 
5.  Czech Republic  
6.  Denmark  
7.  Estonia  
8.   Finland  
9.  France  
10.  Germany  
11.  Greece  
12. Hong Kong  
 
13.  Hungary  
14.  Iceland  
15.  Ireland  
16.   Israel  
17.  Italy  
18.  Japan  
19. Korea South  
20. Kuwait  
21.  Netherlands  
22.  New Zealand  
23.   Norway 
24. Poland  
 
 
25. Portugal 
26.  Saudi Arabia 
27. Singapore  
28.  Slovenia  
29.  Spain  
30.  Sweden  
31.  Switzerland  
32.  Taiwan  
33.   United Arab 
Emirates  
34.  United Kingdom  
35.  United States  
 
 
 
 
 
 
